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Article 2

A FEW QUESTIONS ABOUT CROSS BURNING,
INTIMIDATION, AND FREE SPEECH
Steven G. Gey*
INTRODUCTION

In Virginia v. Black, the Supreme Court held by a 7-2 vote that
cross burning is constitutionally protected speech.' This will come as
something of a surprise to members of the general public who merely
glanced at newspaper headlines about the decision because most of
the nation's major newspapers reported that the Court reached precisely the opposite conclusion. Many newspapers bluntly announced2
that the Court had decided to permit states to ban cross burning.
Other newspapers hedged their characterization somewhat, but the
clear implication of even these reports was that free speech claims surof cross burning were significantly weakened by the
rounding the act
3
action.
Court's
The newspaper headlines may be correct in suggesting that the
Court's decision in Black significantly reduced free speech protection
of radical and antagonistic speech in the cross-burning case. Then
again, they may not. The simple fact is that we have no way of knowing exactly what Black portends for free speech because (to put the
matter unkindly) Justice O'Connor's opinion in the cross burning
* Steven G. Gey is the David and Deborah Fonvielle and Donald and Janet
Hinkle Professor of Law at the Florida State University College of Law.
1 Virginia v. Black, 538 U.S. 343 (2003).
2 See Court Upholds Ban on Cross-Burning,NEWSDAY, Apr. 8, 2003, at A28; Linda
Feldmann, High Court Upholds Ban on Cross Burning,CHRISTIAN ScI. MONITOR, Apr. 8,
2003, at 3; Steve Lash, Court Rules States Can Ban Cross-Burning,ATLANTA J.-CONST.,
Apr. 8, 2003, at Al; Patty Reinert, High Court Upholds Cross-Burning Ban, Hous.
CHRON., Apr. 8, 2003, at IA; Edward Walsh, State Bans on Cross Burning Upheld, WASH.
POST, Apr. 8, 2003, at Al.
3 Lyle Denniston, Court Rules Cross Burning Can Be Crime, BOSTON GLOBE, Apr. 8,

2003, at A2; Bob Egelko, Most Cross BurningRuled Illegal, S.F. CHRON., Apr. 8, 2003, at
A14; Jan Crawford Greenburg, High Court Limits Ban on Burning of Crosses, CHI. TmuB.,
Apr. 8, 2003, at 1; Linda Greenhouse, Justices Allow Bans on Cross Burnings Intended as
Threats, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 8, 2003, at Al; David G. Savage, Justices Limit Cross Burners'
Claim to Free Speech, L.A. TIMES, Apr. 8, 2003, at A20.
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case borders on the incoherent. The Court sends several different
messages about free speech in Black, many of which contradict each
other. At least some of these messages may signal significant and
troubling changes in the constitutional standard applicable to political advocacy-the cornerstone of modern First Amendment free
speech jurisprudence.
There are several layers of conflicting messages in Black. To cite
only the most prominent examples: first, although the Court held that
the act of cross burning contains constitutionally protected expressive
elements, the Court also upheld the Virginia statute criminalizing instances of cross burning in which the speaker acted "with the intent of
intimidating any person or group of persons."4 Second, although the
Court held that "intimidating" speech is merely a subset of constitutionally unprotected "true threats," 5 the Court declined to identify the
elements of a "true threat." Although the Supreme Court has never
deigned to define the term, some lower courts have interpreted the
concept of a "true threat" to cover particularized speech directed toward a specific and identifiable target. 6 If this definition is accurate,
then it is inconsistent with the Court's expansion of the category to
cover speech intended to "intimidate" large and undifferentiated
groups of people. Third, although Justice O'Connor began her majority opinion with a long description of the burning cross as a universal and singular symbol of hatred, which is used specifically to
intimidate and terrorize, she rejected Justice Thomas's contention
that the expressive value of cross burning is overwhelmed by its invariable use as a "signal of impending terror and lawlessness," which "almost invariably meant lawlessness and understandably instills in its
victims well-grounded fear of physical violence. ''7 Fourth, although
Justice O'Connor held unconstitutional the portion of the Virginia
statute that made the burning of a cross prima facie evidence of an
intent to intimidate, she refused to hold the statute unconstitutionally
overbroad, thus casting doubt on what constitutional standard was
used to strike down part of the statute. Finally, although Justice
O'Connor's plurality opinion effectively permits the state to prosecute
those who burn a cross if the state can prove an intent to intimidate,
she remanded only two of the three cases before the Court for a determination of the requisite intent.8 The Court rejected any such recon4 VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2423 (Lexis 2004). Although in 2003 the Supreme Court
declared § 18.2-423 unconstitutional, the section remains in the 2004 Virginia Code.
5 Black, 538 U.S. at 360.
6 See infra notes 193-260 and accompanying text.
7 Black, 538 U.S. at 391 (ThomasJ., dissenting).
8 Id. at 367-68 (plurality opinion).
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sideration of the third case, suggesting that in some circumstances the
expressive value of cross burning is so overwhelming that the First
Amendment prohibits the government from prosecuting the burning
of a cross even if the action is undertaken with the requisite intent.
Thus, although it seems that some element other than a general intent to intimidate is required before the state can prosecute the burning of a cross, Justice O'Connor does not discuss what this additional
factor may be.
None of this would matter much if Black were nothing more than
a solitary instance of the Court looking the other way while a state
government criminalized an isolated example of highly unpopular
speech by a small handful of political crackpots. If Black could be
explained away in this manner, the opinion would be subject to criticism as sloppy, intellectually dishonest, or perhaps a lamentable deviation from the Holmesian tradition of protecting even the speech of
9
politically reviled "poor and puny anonymities," but it would not do
serious damage to the general range of First Amendment free speech
protections. Unfortunately, Black cannot be dismissed so lightly.
Black is another in a growing number of decisions (in both the Supreme Court and the lower courts) that carve out expansive doctrinal
exceptions to the very cornerstone of the First Amendment: the nearly
absolute protection of political advocacy and radical dissent. Other
recent examples of this trend include decisions denying constitutional
protection to speech communicating a disfavored motive for illegal
actions, 10 cases involving speech that teaches the methods of illegal
threats.' 12
activity,'" and cases broadly defining the concept of "true
In Black, the Court has now added to this list the new and potentially
expansive category of "intimidating" speech.
9 Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 629 (1919).
10 See Wisconsin v. Mitchell, 508 U.S. 476, 490 (1993) (upholding a Wisconsin
hate crime enhancement statute).
11 See Rice v. Paladin Enter., 128 F.3d 233 (4th Cir. 1997), cert. denied, 523 U.S.
1074 (1998) (reversing the district court's summary judgment holding that the First
Amendment bars a civil cause of action); see also Stewart v. McCoy, 537 U.S. 993, 995
(2002) (Stevens,J., opinion respecting denial of petition for writ of certiorari) (arguing that the imminent lawless action component of the Brandenburg v. Ohio standard
for political advocacy "does not necessarily adhere to some speech that performs a
teaching function").
12 See Planned Parenthood v. Am. Coalition of Life Activists, Inc., 290 F.3d 1058
(9th Cir. 2002), cert. denied, 539 U.S. 958 (2003) (holding that actions of anti-abortion
activists in publicly disclosing information about abortion providers through "Guilty"
posters and the "Nuremberg Files" website constituted "true threats" and thus was
beyond the protection of the First Amendment).
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This Article is a critique of the Court's new category of "intimidating" speech and how that new category of speech fits into the series of
ongoing judicial attempts to undermine basic First Amendment protections of radical political speech and dissent. Part I describes in
more detail the many inconsistent themes of the case summarized
above. Part II addresses the contradictions between settled doctrine
regarding content and viewpoint discrimination, and the Court's willingness to uphold such discrimination against cross burners. Part III
discusses yet another doctrine mangled by the Court's decision in
Black: the overbreadth doctrine. Part IV addresses the relationship of
intimidating speech and the concept of the "true threat," focusing on
the Supreme Court's consistent refusal to define the latter category
and the continuing efforts in the lower courts to define a "true threat"
in the face of the Supreme Court's silence. Part V addresses the heart
of the matter: how can "intimidating" speech be denied First Amendment protection in light of the fact that several major First Amendment free speech cases decided during the last century dealt with
speech that contained overtones of intimidation indistinguishable
from those in Black?
As a final introductory note before turning to the merits of Black,
this Article is about the burning of crosses only in the most superficial
sense. However reviled Klansmen and their speech may be, they are
not the only hated political group in this culture. The same legal
principles that apply to speech by the Klan also will permit the dominant political culture to penalize, criminalize, and otherwise seek to
suppress the speech of other groups of political outsiders. It is by now
a First Amendment commonplace that these tendencies will inevitably
intensify during times of crisis. The Court may have even hinted at
the broader implications of its doctrine in Black itself. The words "terror" or "terrorism" appear eleven times in the various Black opinions.
In these days when such words get tossed around freely by law enforcement officials and politicians, the potential implications of Black
reach far beyond the handful of anachronistic miscreants who were
the defendants in that case.
I.

THE MIRRORED WALLS OF VIRGINIA V.

BLAcK

The mark of a badly written opinion is that the reader has more
questions about the state of the law after reading the opinion than
before. By that measure Justice O'Connor's Black opinion is very
badly written. The facts, at least, are relatively straightforward. Virginia has a statute prohibiting "any person or persons, with the intent
of intimidating any person or group of persons, to burn, or cause to
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be burned, a cross on the property of another, a highway or other
public place."' 3 The statute also contains a provision allowing the requisite intent to be presumed from the act itself: "Any such burning of
a cross shall be prima facie evidence of an intent to intimidate a per14

son or group of persons."

The three individuals whose appeals were joined in Black were
convicted separately under the statute. Two of the defendants were
convicted after burning a cross in the front yard of their neighbor to
"get back" at the neighbor for complaining about the defendants'
habit of using their backyard as a firing range. 15 The cross was burned
16 The neighapproximately twenty feet from the neighbor's house.
bor was African American and the defendants were white, although
there was no evidence the defendants were affiliated with the Ku Klux
Klan.

17

The third defendant was a member of the Ku Klux Klan. He was
convicted under the Virginia statute because of his involvement as
8
"the head of' a Klan rally at which a cross was burned.' The rally was
19
held on private property, with the permission of the property owner.
The cross burning that led to the third defendant's conviction involved a twenty-five- to thirty-foot-high cross, which was placed approximately 300 to 350 yards away from a public road, from which the
cross could be seen.20 The rally was observed by a woman from the
2
lawn of her in-laws' house located in the vicinity of the rally. ' The
woman was white and was related to the owner of the property used by
the Klan. 22 Her testimony provided the main evidence of intimida3
tion flowing from the rally.2 She testified that the cross burning

made her feel "awful" and "terrible." The Supreme Court summarized her testimony:
During the rally, [the woman who observed the rally] heard Klan
members speak about "what they were" and "what they believed in."
The speakers "talked real bad about the blacks and the Mexicans."
One speaker told the assembled gathering that "he would love to
ANN. § 18.2-423 (Lexis 2004).

13

VA. CODE

14

Id.

15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23

Virginia v. Black, 538 U.S. 343, 350 (2003).
Id.
Id.
Id. at 349-50.
Id. at 348.
Id. at 348-49.
Id. at 348.
Id.
Id. at 349.
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take a .30/.30 and just random ly] shoot the blacks." The speakers
also talked about "President Clinton and Hillary Clinton," and
about how their tax money "goes to . . . the black people." [The
woman] testified that this language made her "very ... scared." 24
There are obvious differences between the facts of the first two
cases and the facts of the third. The first two defendants were engaged in activity that would fit a range of different criminal and civil
offenses that are not directly concerned with expressive activity. The
action of these defendants could plausibly be construed as reckless
endangerment, arson, criminal mischief, trespassing, intentional infliction of emotional distress, or an ordinary threat. The third defendant was in a very different situation than the first two. His actions
would not fit any of the offenses noted above. In fact, but for the
Virginia statute targeting the act of cross burning, his action would
not be criminal at all. His expression occurred in the context of a
political rally on private property, far removed from any direct target
of the group's aggressively racist message. Although the rally could be
seen from neighboring properties and a nearby public road, 25 the
Klansmen's speech seems to have been directed primarily at supporters of the Klan's message.
At first glance, these factual differences between the two sets of
defendants lend credibility to the Court's ultimate decision in Black.
The Court's decision was to reverse the conviction of the third defendant and remand the cases of the first two defendants for a factual
determination of whether they indeed had the requisite intent to intimidate their neighbor. 26 This result seems correct, except for the
fact that it does not follow from any of the analysis of the statute in
Justice O'Connor's opinion.
As is typical in First Amendment cases, the defendants did not
assert that the First Amendment protected their behavior from all legal sanctions; they merely claimed that the statute under which they
were convicted constituted a facially overbroad content-based regulation of speech. The Court rejected this legal claim. Although the
Court held unconstitutional the presumed intent portion of the statute, it upheld the statute's basic thrust-i.e., that "intimidating"
speech taking the form of cross burning can be punished by criminal
sanctions. In light of this conclusion, it is difficult to understand why
the third defendant's conviction was reversed. Although his speech
was not directed at a specific target, as was the speech of the first two
24
25

26

Id. at 348-49 (citations omitted).
The sheriff who arrested Black had watched the rally from this road. Id.
Id. at 367-68.
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defendants, it is not hard to construe the act of burning a cross at a
Klan rally as motivated by (in the words of the Virginia statute) the
27
"intent of intimidating any person or group of persons." How could
statements made in conjunction with the cross burning, such as "[I]
'28
would love to take a .30/.30 and just random [ly] shoot the blacks,"
be construed as anything but evidence of an intention to intimidate
African Americans?
A routine application of the Court's existing First Amendment
jurisprudence could easily explain why the third defendant's conviction was overturned, but under this analysis all three defendants' convictions should have been overturned because the statute under which
they were convicted violates three basic First Amendment doctrines.

29
First, under R.A. V. v. City of St. Paul, the statute constitutes an un-

constitutional regulation of content and viewpoint by singling out a
particular expressive act for special legal regulation. Second, under
31
3
United States v. O'Brien" and Brandenburg v. Ohio, the statute is an
unconstitutional regulation of symbolic speech and political advocacy
because it attaches criminal sanctions to symbolic speech communicating a message of protected political advocacy. Third, since much
of the speech covered by the statute is constitutionally protected, the
32
statute is unconstitutionally overbroad under Broadrick v. Oklahoma.
Under the routine application of existing First Amendment doctrine,
therefore, it is simple to explain why the Court overturned the third
defendant's conviction, but impossible to explain why-at least with
regard to their prosecution under this particular statute-the Court
allowed the state to retry the other two defendants.
The central problem with Justice O'Connor's opinion for the
Court in Black is that she rejects all of the standard First Amendment
doctrinal critiques of the Virginia cross burning statute. As for the
content- and viewpoint-regulation problem, O'Connor first emphasizes the distinctively harmful nature of cross burning as a justification
for legal regulation. 33 She then reverses course to assert that cross
burning has serious First Amendment value because the symbolic ac34
tion has significant political content. She then reverses course once
again to hold that, at least in the context of "intimidating" speech,
27

VA. CODE ANN.§ 18.2-423 (Lexis 2004).

28

Black, 538 U.S. at 349.

29

505 U.S. 377 (1992).

30 391 U.S. 367 (1968).
31
32
33

395 U.S. 444 (1969) (per curiam).
413 U.S. 601 (1973).
Black, 538 U.S. at 352-57.

34

Id. at 365-67.

1294

NOTRE

DAME

LAW

REVIEW

[VOL. 8o:4

Virginia can single out cross burning on the basis of content as a criminal activity. 35 The plurality's position on the overbreadth claim is

even more mysterious because Justice O'Connor never addresses the
issue, and never responds to Justice Scalia's scathing critique of her
failure to address the issue. Again, the question is why the majority
overturned the third defendant's conviction. If the statute did not
impermissibly regulate his speech on content or viewpoint grounds,
and if the statute was not overbroad for some other reason, then his
conviction seemingly should have survived First Amendment scrutiny.
The third First Amendment issue involves the bedrock principle
that political advocacy is protected from government regulation unless the advocacy takes the form of incitement, the advocacy occurs in
a context where an immediate concrete harm follows from the speech
in question, and the speaker intends his or her speech to instigate the
immediate harm. These are the essential elements of the First
Amendment analysis for political advocacy set forth in Brandenburgv.
Ohio.3

6

As with her discussion of content and viewpoint regulation,

Justice O'Connor's Black plurality opinion seeks to have it both ways.
On one hand, she cites Brandenburg for the proposition that cross
burning in the context of a political rally "'would almost certainly be
protected expression.'- 37 On the other hand, she permits the state to
single out the expressive act of cross burning in its intimidation statute "because burning a cross is a particularly virulent form of intimidation."3 8 The problem is that the very fact that a burning cross is a
"particularly virulent form of intimidation" is also the reason
the burning cross is a potent political symbol to groups such as the Klan. The
mystery is how the message communicated by the burning cross can
simultaneously be immune from state regulation as protected political
speech and also the sole expressive target of a state criminal statute.
Justice O'Connor's route around this doctrinal gridlock is to treat
the category of "intimidation" as a subset of the unprotected category
of "true threats. '39 As Justice O'Connor notes, "the history of cross
burning in this country shows that cross burning is often intimidating,
intended to create a pervasive fear in victims that they are a target of
violence." 40 Having found a First Amendment pigeonhole into which
she could shove the speech at issue in the Virginia statute, Justice
35
36

Id. at 361-63.
395 U.S. at 447-49.
Black, 538 U.S. at 366 (plurality opinion) (quoting R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul,

37
505 U.S. 377, 402 (1992) (White, J., concurring in the judgment)).
38 Id. at 363.
39 Id. at 360.

40

Id.
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O'Connor chose not to investigate the nature of that pigeonhole or to
analyze whether cross burning is analogous to other forms of speech
already lodged in the "true threats" slot. She also chose not to take
note of the fact that her explanation proves too much and once again
is inconsistent with her ultimate decision to protect the speech of the
third defendant. If, as is certainly true, "the history of cross burning
in this country shows that cross burning is often intimidating, intended to create a pervasive fear in victims that they are a target of
violence," 41 then it is also true that this history is most directly applicable to the Ku Klux Klan and its members, who brought the symbol to
prominence and imbued it with the ominous significance it still carries today. Yet the Court releases from custody the one defendant
who was an active member of the Klan.
As noted earlier, if these puzzles merely related to a few rusty
remnants of a moribund hate group, it would not be worth spending
the time to parse the multiple inconsistencies of the Black majority
opinion. But the way in which the Black majority opinion treats these
central features of First Amendment doctrine says a lot about the current trajectory of free speech jurisprudence. Thus, it is worth dissecting each of the Court's primary doctrinal focal points: the standards
governing content and viewpoint regulation, overbreadth, "true
threats," and radical political advocacy. The following four Parts consider each of these areas in turn.
II.

IFTHIS Is

NOT CONTENT AND VIEWPOINT DISCRIMINATION, THEN
R.A.V. v. CYTY OF ST. PAUL?

WHAT Is LEFT OF

After carefully dissecting the majority opinion in Black, a conscientious reader will know little more than that cross burning is constitutionally protected, except when it is not. The majority opinion does
not clearly demarcate the boundaries of the First Amendment protection that cross burning sometimes enjoys, and much of what the majority opinion does say contradicts what the Court has said recently in
other cases raising similar issues. The confusion and contradictions
do not end with justice O'Connor's plurality opinion. The other four
opinions in the case are equally problematic, and if anything those
opinions make it even harder to understand what effect the decision
has on existing First Amendment doctrine. The most glaring incongruity among the four other Black opinions is Justice Scalia's apparent
abandonment of his previous views regarding content and viewpoint
regulation of speech. He articulated these views in a controversial ma41

Id.
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jority opinion in a case remarkably similar to Black, which was decided
only a few years earlier. The Black majority's contrary treatment of the
Court's earlier content-regulation rules, coupled with Justice Scalia's
apparent indifference to this shift in attitude, may signal a sea change
in one of the most basic principles of free speech jurisprudence. The
fact that this change occurs with virtually no comment does nothing
to diminish the importance of the matter.
A.

R.A.V., the Content Neutrality Mandate, and the Virulence Exception

The content- and viewpoint-regulation rules at issue in Black are a
crucial but complicated bit of First Amendment esoterica. In 1992,
Justice Scalia authored the majority opinion in RA.V v. City of St.
Paul.4 2 R.A. V involved a St. Paul, Minnesota, hate speech ordinance.
The ordinance defined as disorderly conduct the act of placing "on
public or private property a symbol, object, appellation, characterization or graffiti, including, but not limited to, a burning cross or Nazi
swastika, which one knows or has reasonable grounds to know arouses
anger, alarm or resentment in others on the basis of race, color,
creed, religion or gender. '4 3 This action was punished as a misdemeanor. The Minnesota Supreme Court upheld the statute as a regulation of constitutionally unprotected "fighting words. '44
The Supreme Court unanimously reversed, but split 5-4 on the
rationale. Four Justices voted to strike down the statute because the
Minnesota Supreme Court had not interpreted the concept of fighting words narrowly enough to satisfy the constitutional standard, thus
rendering the statute unconstitutionally overbroad. 45 The five-Justice
42 505 U.S. 377 (1992).
43 Id. at 380 (quoting ST. PAUL, MINN., LEGIS. CODE § 292.02 (1990)).
44 See In re Welfare of R.A.V., 464 N.W.2d 507, 510 (Minn. 1991).
45 RA.V., 505 U.S. at 413 (White, J.,concurring in the judgment) ("The
Minnesota Supreme Court erred in its application of the Chaplinsky fighting
words test and
consequently interpreted the St. Paul ordinance in a fashion that rendered
the ordinance facially overbroad."). The origins of the constitutionally unprotected
category
of "fighting words" can be found in the Court's majority opinion in Chaplinsky
v. New
Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568 (1942), in which the Court famously held that some
forms of
expression "are no essential part of any exposition of ideas, and are
of such slight
social value as a step to truth that any benefit that may be derived from them
is clearly
outweighed by the social interest in order and morality." Id. at 572. The
Court noted
that fighting words are an example of this category of socially useless
speech. The
Court defined the concept of fighting words as words "which, by their very
utterance,
inflict injury or tend to incite an immediate breach of the peace." Id. The
Court has
subsequently focused on the "breach of the peace" component of this
definition and
limited the concept to words that are essentially the first blow in a physical
fight. As in
the incitement area, see infra notes 181-89 and accompanying text, the
key to the
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majority did not reach the overbreadth claim, but ruled instead that
the statute was an impermissible regulation of both the content and
viewpoint of speech. 46 Writing on behalf of the majority, Justice Scalia
assumed, for the purposes of considering the content and viewpoint
regulation issue, that the statute had been limited to the narrow cate47
gory of fighting words. Even so, Justice Scalia concluded, the statute
impermissibly regulated content because the statute singled out only
those fighting words pertaining to particular subjects-i.e., race,
48
color, creed, religion or gender. "Displays containing abusive invective, no matter how vicious or severe, are permissible unless they are
''4 9 Justice Scalia
addressed to one of the specified disfavored topics.

went on to hold that the statute was actually a regulation of viewpoint
as well as content, since in many instances only one side of a debate
about bigotry would be permitted to use certain expressive symbols or
displays:
One could hold up a sign saying, for example, that all "anti-Catholic
bigots" are misbegotten; but not that all "papists" are, for that would
insult and provoke violence "on the basis of religion." St. Paul has
no such authority to license one side of a debate to fight freestyle,
rules. 50
while requiring the other to follow Marquis of Queensberry
Four members of the Court refused to join Justice Scalia's majority opinion on the subject of content and viewpoint regulation. The
basic point of contention between the two factions was the issue of
content regulation within a category of unprotected speech. The four
members of the Court who did not join the majority essentially took
the position that if the government regulates a category of speech that
is by definition not protected by the Constitution-such as fighting
words-then the government legitimately can choose to regulate any
subset of that category without being constrained by the ordinary
rules prohibiting the government from regulating the content or viewpoint of speech. 5 1 According to this approach, the government may
concept of
Court's modem interpretation of fighting words is the emphasis on the
the as(underscoring
immediacy. See Gooding v. Wilson, 405 U.S. 518, 524 (1972)
tendirect
"a
having
those
to
words
fighting
pect of the Chaplinsky opinion limiting
is
remark
the
individually,
whom,
to
person
the
by
violence
dency to cause acts of
fighting
(describing
(1989)
409
397,
U.S.
491
Johnson,
v.
Texas
also
see
addressed");
words as a "direct personal insult or an invitation to exchange fisticuffs").
46 R.A.V., 505 U.S. at 381.
47 Id.
48 Id. at 391.
49 Id.
50 Id. at 391-92.
51 Id. at 401 (White, J., concurring in the judgment).
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regulate speech freely within a category of unprotected speech, even
on the basis of ideological or other content. In other words,
the authority to regulate the greater (i.e., the unprotected category
of fighting words) includes the authority to regulate the lesser
(i.e.,
unprotected fighting words that also convey racist sentiments).
AsJustice White sums up this position:
It is inconsistent to hold that the government may proscribe an entire category of speech because the content of that speech is evil,
but that the government may not treat a subset of that category differently without violating the First Amendment; the content of the
subset is by definition worthless and undeserving of constitutional
52
protection.
Although there is a surface logic in this position, it is incompatible with the Court's application of content and viewpoint regulation
rules in other free speech contexts. In public forum cases, for
example, the Court has long permitted governments to impose time,
place,
and manner restrictions on speech. The constitutionality
of time,
place, and manner regulations depends, however, on a judicial
determination that the regulation is not based on the content of the
speech
being regulated. 5 3 Thus, in other contexts the Court has rejected
the
RA. V concurring Justices' theory that the greater authority
(i.e., the
government's general authority to regulate speech that is in
the wrong
place, at the wrong time, or is just too loud for the context)
includes
the lesser (i.e., the authority to regulate only inappropriate
speech
carrying a particular message).
There is something intuitively unsettling about the R.A. V concurrence's approach that is highlighted by the Court's unwillingness
to
accept content- and viewpoint-based applications of other
First
Amendment rules. It is one thing for the government to
regulate
speech that creates unreasonable noise or traffic congestion;
it is quite
another for the government to regulate only noise or congestion
caused by Communists or Klansmen. The underlying problem
(i.e.,
congestion or noise) may be one that robs speech of total
First
52

Id.at 401 (White, J., concurring in the judgment) (citations omitted).

53 According to the Court, all expression "issubject to reasonable time,
place, or
manner restrictions ...provided that they are justified without reference
to the content of the regulated speech, that they are narrowly tailored to
serve a significant

governmental interest, and that they leave open ample alternative channels
munication of the information." Clark v. Cmty. for Creative Non-Violence, for com468 U.S.
288, 293 (1984). "The principal inquiry in determining content neutrality,
in speech

cases generally and in time, place, or manner cases in particular, is whether
the government has adopted a regulation of speech because of disagreement with

sage it conveys." Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 791
(1989).

the mes-
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Amendment protection, but if the problem is not addressed in a general fashion (i.e., with regard to all speech creating the same probreal
lem), then there is good reason to suspect that the government's
target is neither the sound nor the traffic, but rather the obnoxious
fight that
ideas. Likewise, it is one thing for the government to stop a
to
government
the
is instigated by angry words; it is quite another for
peace.
put only politically unpopular fighters in jail for breaching the
The logical flaws and unacceptable consequences that follow
from the RA.V concurrence's greater-includes-the-lesser approach
the
can be highlighted if the focus of analysis is broadened beyond
conFirst Amendment. The main intuition behind the concurrence's
clusion is that speakers should not be able to raise a First Amendment
seek to
defense to criminal sanctions if the expressive conduct they
the
suppose
But
defend is in general constitutionally unprotected.
AmeriCity of St. Paul enacted a statute that prohibited only African
cans or Catholics (or some other specifically identified racial, ethnic,
or religious group) from engaging in constitutionally unprotected
fighting words. The obvious conclusion is that such a statute would
But
violate the Fourteenth Amendment's Equal Protection Clause.
the
why would such a strange statute not be susceptible to the logic of
V.
greater-includes-the-lesser approach? The basic notion of the R.A.
exam(for
protection
concurrence is that one type of constitutional
ple, the general First Amendment rules prohibiting content regulation of speech) does not apply to behavior that is deemed
speech
unprotected on other constitutional grounds (for example,
jurispruwords
fighting
Court's
the
that is deemed unprotected under
dence). Thus, the R.A. V concurrence concludes that the governthe
ment may choose to regulate only one content-based subset of
unprotected conduct-i.e., the subset of unprotected5 4fighting words
But if this is
defined by hateful symbols such as a burning cross.
to
government
the
true, then why does that same logic not permit
conregulate a somewhat different subset of the same unprotected
duct-i.e., unprotected fighting words uttered by members of a statuto
torily targeted racial, ethnic, or religious group? The easy answer
of
category
entire
the
deem
this is that the constitutional rules that
constituthe
with
speech constitutionally unprotected have little to do
ethtional rules prohibiting the government from singling out racial,
same
nic, or religious groups for unfavorable treatment. But that
the
V:
RA.
in
discussed
rules
answer applies to the content-regulation
regulate
to
reason the First Amendment permits the government
fighting words has little to do with the reason the First Amendment
54

R.A.V., 505 U.S. at 401 (White, J., concurring in the judgment).
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does not permit the government to single out speech for unfavorable
treatment based on the content or viewpoint of the speech. Thus,
while the government may regulate all unprotected fighting words, it
may not regulate only those fighting words uttered by a racial, ethnic,
or religious group the government does not want to hear, and it also
may not regulate only those fighting words that involve ideas disfavored by the government.
Justice Scalia's majority opinion in RA.V makes a similar point
in a somewhat different way by noting that the First Amendment rules
prohibiting content and viewpoint discrimination apply to every step
of the government's decisionmaking process in regulating expression.
Thus, while the government's initial decision to regulate a particular
problem (such as fights) may be content-neutral, the subsequent decision to redress only particular examples of that problem may represent an overt attempt to suppress disfavored ideas. "[A] particular
instance of speech can be proscribable on the basis of one feature
(e.g., obscenity) but not on the basis of another (e.g., opposition to
the city government)." 55 The government may not use its generalized
authority at the first level of regulation to cloak its impermissible motives with regard to the second level of regulation.
The conceptual problem with the R.A. V majority's theory is that
it seems to lead to an all-or-nothing approach to the regulation of
unprotected expression. 56 As Justice White complained in R.A.V:
55 Id. at 385.
56 The conceptual problem addressed in the text has been the focal point
of
criticism of R.A.V. within the Supreme Court. Academic criticism of Justice Scalia's
!A. V opinion has tended to focus on a different problem. The main thrust
of the
academic criticism of RA.V is that R.A.V. ignores the constitutional values that justify
hate speech regulations and other statutes imposing sanctions on racist expression.
Akhil Amar authored one prominent example of this critique. See Akhil Reed
Amar,
The Case of the Missing Amendments: R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 106 HARV. L. REV.
124
(1992). Amar argues that the St. Paul ordinance struck down in RA.V could
have
been upheld by interpreting the First Amendment protection of free speech in
light
of the government's Thirteenth and Fourteenth Amendment obligation to protect
against racial discrimination. See id. at 151-60. In short, Amar argues that the
First
Amendment is limited by the Reconstruction amendments:
All nine Justices analyzed cross burning and other forms of racial hate
speech by focusing almost exclusively on the First Amendment. They all
seemed to have forgotten that it is a Constitution they are expounding, and
that the Constitution contains not just the First Amendment, but the Thirteenth and Fourteenth Amendments as well.
Id. at 125.
The basic argument is that racial hate speech is a badge of slavery, which the
Thirteenth Amendment is intended to eradicate. Id. at 155. Thus, a narrow version
of the St. Paul hate speech ordinance could be viewed as a legitimate exercise
of
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government authority to limit speech in order to advance a strong countervailing constitutional value.
There are many problems with this approach, which may explain why the
the
courts-including the Virginia v. Black majority-have failed to adopt (and for
hate
racial
the
that
is
problem
most part have largely ignored) this theory. The first
arspeech exception to the First Amendment would be very difficult to limit. Amar
hate
to
protection
constitutional
deny
to
only
used
be
should
gues that the theory
at 157.
speech that "present[s] no realistic threat to the hard core of free speech." Id.
directed
regulations
speech
Thus, Amar seems to support the constitutionality of hate
statutes
at racially hateful fighting words, id. at 157, but not of "obviously overbroad"
of
display
the
"criminalize
would
that
ordinance)
Paul
(such as a literally read St.
political
a
say,
at,
supremacy
white
of
emblems
other
and
crosses,
burning
swastikas,
rally in support of David Duke's presidential campaign." Id. at 127. It is understandaa
ble that Amar would want to stop short of criminalizing overtly political speech by
slavery
of
badge
expressive
an
why
clear
entirely
political candidate, but it is not
would be robbed of its symbolic significance in one context and not another-espealso
cially when the racially hateful message is exactly the same in both situations. It is
Fourteenth
The
speech.
hate
difficult to see how Amar could limit his theory to racial
as
Amendment protection against discrimination now extends to characteristics such
imposes
Amendment
Fourteenth
the
limitations
whatever
so
and
gender and religion,
on the First Amendment logically should extend to other groups that enjoy heightened scrutiny status as well.
Finally, and most importantly, there is no reason to limit Amar's logic to the
Reconstruction amendments. The same structural logic that would require the Court
to balance First Amendment rights against the Thirteenth and Fourteenth Amendments would also seem to require the Court to balance the First Amendment against
is
the powers and rights afforded under every other constitutional provision. Nor
If
Rights.
of
Bill
the
there any reason to limit the argument to the first provision of
of
protection
constitutional
the Thirteenth Amendment limits First Amendment
speech, then it should also limit the Fourth Amendment's constitutional protection
against unlawful searches and seizures. The government should therefore be allowed
to conduct searches of the property of alleged lawbreakers who are also Klansmen
under more lenient rules than searches directed against ordinary lawbreakers.
The argument that the First Amendment and its companions in the Bill of Rights
inshould be limited by the interests represented in other constitutional provisions,
of
Rights
of
Bill
the
rob
would
Amendments,
Fourteenth
and
cluding the Thirteenth
attimodern
its
revisit
to
have
would
Court
the
Moreover,
substance.
any significant
tude toward the Espionage Act opinions issued after the First World War. See, e.g.,
U.S. 211
Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616 (1919); Debs v. United States, 249
249
States,
United
v.
Schenck
(1919);
204
U.S.
249
States,
(1919); Frohwerk v. United
thoroughly
been
"has
convictions
those
supporting
reasoning
The
(1919).
47
U.S.
But
discredited by later decisions." Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 447 (1969).
all,
After
reasonable.
quite
appear
under Amar's structural approach the convictions
its
exercising
by
enacted
had
Congress
statutes
under
obtained
the convictions were
war.
declared
a
fight
to
order
in
draft
military
a
initiate
to
I
Article
under
authority
anOne constitutional provision (the First Amendment) should thus be limited by
critithis
up
summed
have
Volokh
Eugene
and
other (Article I). Judge Alex Kozinski
cism of Amar's position: "In exercising its other powers ...

the government is entirely

bound by the Bill of Rights. Why should it be any less bound in exercising its Thir-
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"[S] hould the government want to criminalize certain fighting words,
the Court now requires it to criminalize all fighting words." 5 7 Justice
Scalia responds to this by arguing that content-neutral justifications of
some regulations may be used to distinguish among different manifestations of the unprotected category of speech.5 8 Justice Scalia elaborates on this argument in R.A. V. by creating a series of exceptions to
the general rule of content neutrality, which the Black majority would
subsequently use (with the endorsement of Justice Scalia) to undermine R.A. V's basic rule prohibiting the government from engaging in
content or viewpoint discrimination.59
In R.A. V., Justice Scalia proposed three broad exceptions to the
general rule that a statute may not regulate selected examples of unprotected speech. The first exception applies when "the basis for the
content discrimination consists entirely of the very reason the entire
class of speech at issue is proscribable." 60 This exception justifies government action to focus its regulatory attention on the most virulent
instances of unprotected speech. Justice Scalia's list of examples of
this exception includes statutes regulating extreme versions of obscenity, the federal statute singling out for special punishment threats to
the President, and commercial speech regulations focusing on industries in which the risk of fraud is especially high. 61
Justice Scalia's second exception permits the government to regulate "a content-defined subclass of proscribable speech" if "that . . .
subclass happens to be associated with particular 'secondary effects' of
the speech, so that the regulation is justified without reference to the
content of the . .. speech.'"62 This convoluted description applies
primarily to situations in which words are part of a proscribed action
(such as the use of words to communicate state secrets in a treason
case) or a particular type of speech creates nonexpressive harms that
the state must address. Examples include the regulation of rock concerts to control the noise affecting surrounding neighborhoods63 or
the regulation of adult bookstores or movie theaters to control the

teenth Amendment Enforcement Clause power?" Alex Kozinski & Eugene Volokh, A
Penumbra Too Far, 106 HARV. L. REV. 1639, 1649-50 (1993).
57 R.A.V., 505 U.S. at 401 (White, J., concurring in the judgment).
58
59
60
61
62
63

Id. at 387.
Id. at 388-90.
Id. at 388.
Id.
Id. at 389.
See Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781 (1989).
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deleterious effects on the64property values and the ambiance of surrounding neighborhoods.

The final exception is a catch-all category that is the vaguest of
the three. The third exception applies to any government action regulating speech in which "the nature of the content discrimination is
such that there is no realistic possibility that official suppression of
ideas is afoot. ' 65 It is difficult to imagine when such a scenario might
arise, and Justice Scalia's one hypothetical example of this exception
is not helpful: "We cannot think of any First Amendment interest that
would stand in the way of a State's prohibiting only those obscene
motion pictures with blue-eyed actresses.

' 66

This unlikely illustration,

coupled with the broad phrasing of the exception, is not comforting.
It seems to leave open the possibility of exempting from the ordinary
rules any regulation of speech justified by a sufficiently public-spirited
government motive. The problem is that historically all of the government's efforts to censor radical political speech have been motivated
by the same ostensibly content-neutral reasons. Justice Sanford's 1925
opinion upholding the New York Syndicalism Act convictions of So64 See City of Renton v. Playtime Theaters, Inc., 475 U.S. 41 (1989); Young v. Am.
Mini Theatres, Inc., 427 U.S. 50 (1976). Both of these cases involved zoning regulations that isolated adult entertainment establishments by prohibiting any regulated
establishment from being located within a certain distance from any other such establishment or a residential area. In both cases the Court recognized that the statutes
identified businesses based on the content of the speech disseminated within those
establishments, but the Court nevertheless characterized this as a content-neutral regulation because the city's "predominant concern" was the secondary effects surrounding the theater rather than the content of the films inside the theater. Playtime
Theaters, 475 U.S. at 47. In both cases the cities justified their ordinances by relying
on assumptions and studies of the effects of adult establishments in other cities. Id. at
51 ("The First Amendment does not require a city, before enacting such an ordinance, to conduct new studies or produce evidence independent of that already generated by other cities."). More recently, however, several members of the Court have
announced that cities should be forced to prove the existence of secondary effects
rather than simply assume that such effects exist. See City of Los Angeles v. Alameda
Books, Inc., 535 U.S. 425, 458 (2002) (Souter, J., dissenting) (asserting that cities
should be forced to provide empirical justifications for assumptions about the secondary effects of adult business ordinances); id. at 453 (Kennedy, J., concurring in the
judgment) (noting that if a city's "assumptions [about secondary effects] can be
proved unsound at trial, then the ordinance might not withstand intermediate scrutiny"). It is unclear whether a majority of the Court takes this position because although Justice Breyer (along with two otherJustices) joined Justice Souter's dissent in
Alameda Books, Justice Breyer did not join the portion ofJustice Souter's opinion that
imposed the empirical evidence requirement.
65 PA.V., 505 U.S. at 390.
66

Id.
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cialist Party activists in Gitlow v. New York, 6 7 for example, was predicated on his assertion that the state was punishing "not the expression
of philosophical abstraction," 68 but rather the abuse of this expression
"by utterances inimical to the public welfare, tending to corrupt public morals, incite to crime, or disturb the public peace." 69 Translating
this into the language ofJustice Scalia's third R.A.V exception, from
Justice Sanford's perspective there was no realistic possibility that official suppression of ideas was afoot, since the state was merely trying to
protect public order. But if that is so, then Justice Scalia's third exception revives a decision that has long been deemed overruled in favor
of the Holmes and Brandeis approach, which the Court adopted in
theory in Dennis v. United States70 and in practice in Brandenburg v.
Ohio.7 1 Apparently Robert Bork was right about the limited scope of
the First Amendment after all. 7 2
Of course, the Court has not decided to revive Gitlow, and Robert
Bork's views on First Amendment protection of political speech are
still distinctly a minority position. But the fact that the phrasing of
Justice Scalia's R.A. V opinion could lead to these conclusions highlights a problem with the opinion. Moreover, the fuzzy substance of
Justice Scalia's third RA. V exception is simply one example of an
even larger problem. Although Justice Scalia attempted to give at
least two of his three R.A. V exceptions content by providing multiple
examples from existing First Amendment case law, all three exceptions are phrased broadly enough to provide the Court an easy route
around the basic holding of RA. V-which is that government regulation of speech based on viewpoint is always unconstitutional and regulation of speech based on content is unconstitutional in all but a very
narrow range of exceptional circumstances. 73
67 268 U.S. 652 (1925).
68 Id. at 665.
69 Id. at 667.
70 341 U.S. 494, 507 (1951) ("Although no case subsequent to Whitney and Gitlow
has expressly overruled the majority opinions in those cases, there is little doubt that
subsequent opinions have inclined toward the Holmes-Brandeis rationale.").
71 395 U.S. 444, 447 (1969) (per curiam) (noting that the Court's early free
speech standard has been "thoroughly discredited by later decisions" and adopting
the nearly absolute protection of advocacy discussed in Part V, infra).
72 See Robert H. Bork, Neutral Pinciples and Some FirstAmendment Problems, 47 IND.
L.J. 1, 35 (1971) (arguing that the Holmes and Brandeis approach to free speech
issues is misguided and asserting that Justice Sanford's deferential approach and his
rejection of the clear and present danger test "have never been discredited, or even
met").
73 R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 382-83 (1992).

2005]

CROSS

BURNING,

INTIMIDATION,

AND

FREE SPEECH

1305

In Black the Court demonstrated how easily Justice Scalia's exceptions could be used to circumvent the basic R.A. V mandate of content and viewpoint neutrality. According to Justice O'Connor's Black
majority opinion, the Virginia cross burning statute is an example of
the first R.A.V exception, which permits regulation of especially viru74
Building on her assertion
lent examples of unprotected speech.
75
"true threats,"
unprotected
of
subset
a
merely
is
that "intimidation"
Justice O'Connor argues that "[t]he First Amendment permits Virginia to outlaw cross burnings done with the intent to intimidate be76
cause burning a cross is a particularly virulent form of intimidation."
According to Justice O'Connor, cross burning is "particularly virulent"
in light of "cross burning's long and pernicious history as a signal of
impending violence." 77 This long history is presumably the association of cross burning with the Klan, a history recounted in some detail
78
But if this
at the beginning of Justice O'Connor's majority opinion.
virulence
the
then
is what makes cross burning "particularly virulent,"
is a function of the symbolic politics of the Klan, which means that the
state is basing a criminal punishment on the government's response
to the extremist political views of a lawbreaker, which seems to be exactly the sort of content and viewpoint discrimination prohibited by
the general rule described in RKA. V Justice O'Connor rejects this interpretation. She notes that two of the three defendants may not have
had Klan views at all 79 and denies that the burning cross has any association with racism or a political ideology based on hatred of religious
groups.
Unlike the statute at issue in R.A.V, the Virginia statute does not
single out for opprobrium only that speech directed toward "one of
the specified disfavored topics." It does not matter whether an individual burns a cross with intent to intimidate because of the victim's
race, gender, or religion, or because of the victim's "political affiliation, union membership, or homosexuality." Moreover, as a factual
matter it is not true that cross burners direct8 0their intimidating conduct solely to racial or religious minorities.
But if this is true, then the cross is robbed of the very historical
significance-"cross burning's long and pernicious history as a signal
74 Virginia v. Black, 538 U.S. 343, 361-63 (2003).
75 Id. at 360. The various flaws in this assertion are explored in Part IV, infra. See
infra notes 151-289 and accompanying text.
76 Black, 538 U.S. at 363.
77 Id.
78 Id. at 352-57.
79 Id. at 363.
80 Id. at 362 (citations omitted).
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of impending violence" 8 1-that Justice O'Connor cites as the reason
the burning cross is a "particularly virulent" form of intimidation. So
which is it? Is the cross a historical symbol of impending violence tied
to the Klan's hatred of certain racial and religious groups? If so, then
the symbol is a content- and viewpoint-laden symbol of targeted hatred. Or is it a symbol now divorced from its history and therefore
robbed of any particularized content of the sort conjured up by visions of night riders and lynchings? If so, then the symbol has no
particular significance, and is just one of many methods of communicating a threat, which should not be used as the focal point of a specialized threats statute. The Court cannot have it both ways.
Justice O'Connor's attempt to finesse the logical difficulties of
reconciling Virginia's cross burning statute with the Court's contentand viewpoint-regulation rules set forth in RA.V. ends up producing
an opinion that is both factually disingenuous and legally incoherent.
The burning cross is an especially potent symbol precisely-and exclusively-because of its political overtones. It is a symbol inextricably
bound up with the extremist political views of one particular groupthe Ku Klux Klan. Even when that quintessential symbol of the Klan is
used by non-Klansmen, and even when it is aimed at those who are
not usually the focus of the Klan's ire-i.e., individuals other than racial or religious minorities-the speech in question is used specifically
because of its heavily laden overtones of xenophobic exclusivity and
overt hostility to those not conforming to the Klan's political ideal.
The government is singling out this speech for special criminal sanctions for the same reason-because the symbol represents the ugly
ideals of the Klan. But the very fact that everyone involved in disputes
over cross burning focuses on the same clear meaning of the symbol is
also why the speech must be constitutionally protected. This is the
central meaning ofJustice Scalia's majority opinion in RA.V.: the government is always authorized to regulate threats or the verbal instigation of fights, but the government cannot use its power to suppress
ideas with which it vehemently disagrees.
B.

Virulence as Concrete Consequences

The only way to resolve the dilemma created by the introduction
of a "virulence" exception to the general prohibition of content and
viewpoint regulation is to read "virulence" as a completely speech-neutral term. In other words, the concept of an especially "virulent" subset of an unprotected category of speech should be limited to
81

Id. at 363.
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examples of unprotected speech that produce a greater magnitude of
concrete consequences than the ordinary speech falling into that category. For example, obscenity that is produced using children can be
regulated more vigorously (and under a more lenient constitutional
standard) than ordinary obscenity because of the consequences to the
children who are forced to participate in the making of the expressive
'8 3
material.8 2 Such speech "itself is the record of sexual abuse," and
may be prohibited even though "some works in this category might
' 84
The key to the constitutionality of such reghave significant value."

ulation is that it targets concrete consequences that are completely
unrelated to the ideas being expressed.
To cite another example from Justice Scalia's RA. V opinion, a
statute singling out threats against the President for special punishment is permissible because the concrete consequences flowing from
such a threat are more extensive than the concrete consequences of a
threat directed at an ordinary person. Even if the threats are not carried out, threats against the President will frequently cause security
personnel to alter the schedule and behavior of the Chief Executive,
which will in turn produce consequences for the country's entire political apparatus. A presidential threat statute is constitutional because, although threats against the President are more likely to be
political in nature than ordinary threats, the government is regulating
the expression because of its concrete consequences, not its political
subject matter.
The notion that exceptions to the content- and viewpoint-neutrality rule should be limited to examples of exceptionally grave concrete
82 The Supreme Court has for many years applied a more lenient constitutional
standard to sexually explicit material produced using children than to similar material depicting the activity of adults. Compare Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 24
(1973) (describing the standard for adult obscenity, which requires the government
to prove that the material in question is patently offensive, prurient, and lacks serious
literary, artistic, or scientific value), with New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747, 756-64
(1982) (describing the constitutional standard for sexually explicit material employing children, to which the three Miller requirements do not apply). The Court has
recently clarified that the concrete consequences represented by the harm of sexual
abuse to the children employed in producing such material-rather than the offensive ideas expressed by the depictions-is the sole reason justifying the lowered constitutional protection of child pornography. See Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coalition, 535
U.S. 234, 250-51 (2002) ("Ferber'sjudgment about child pornography was based upon
how it was made, not on what it communicated. The case reaffirmed that where the
speech is neither obscene nor the product of sexual abuse, it does not fall outside the
protection of the First Amendment.").
83 Free Speech Coalition, 535 U.S. at 250.
84 Id. at 251.
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consequences is not an iron-clad protection against government efforts to surreptitiously target the offensive content of speech. Indeed,
the concurring opinions in &A. V claimed that the St. Paul ordinance
itself fit within the virulence exception described by Justice Scalia. According to Justice White: "A prohibition on fighting words ...is a ban
on a class of speech that conveys an overriding message of personal
injury and imminent violence.... a message that is at its ugliest when
directed against groups that have long been the targets of discrimination."8 5 The key problem with Justice White's rendition of the virulence exception is that he focuses on the "message of personal injury
and imminent violence" as opposed to the nature and magnitude of
the violence itself. Justice White is wrong when he claims that the St.
Paul ordinance regulates an especially virulent form of constitutionally unprotected fighting words because his description of the broader
category misstates the fighting words doctrine. As Justice White himself notes later in his opinion, s6 the fighting words doctrine does not
strip First Amendment protection from speech that sends a generalized "message of personal injury and imminent violence"; speech falls
within the constitutionally unprotected category of fighting words
only if that speech "tend[s] to incite an immediate breach of the
peace. '8 7 This has been interpreted quite literally: "The test is what
men of common intelligence would understand would be words likely
to cause an average addressee to fight."8 8 Thus, contrary to Justice
White's conclusion, the St. Paul ordinance did not fit within Justice
Scalia's virulence exception because the ordinance focused on the
"message of personal injury and imminent violence" rather than
the
concrete consequences-i.e., the magnitude of the violence-caused
by the speech.8 9
85 R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 408-09 (1992) (White, J.,concurring in
the judgment).
86 See id. at 411-15 (White, J., concurring in the judgment).
87 Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 572 (1942).
88 Id. at 573 (quoting State v. Chaplinsky, 18 A.2d 754, 762 (N.H. 1942)).
89 It is frankly difficult to envision how the regulation of any subset of fighting
words could ever be justified under a proper application of the virulence exception.
The proper application of the virulence exception would limit the scope of a statute
regulating some subset of fighting words to speech that in every circumstance caused
a more serious fight than ordinary fighting words. But since every fight is differentand every verbal instigation of a fight equally sui generis-it is impossible to predict
the pugilistic consequences of any specific type of antagonistic speech without regard
to context or circumstances. The regulation of fighting words is thus unlike the regulation of presidential threats, in which a threat directed against the President will
always and in every instance create more serious effects than a threat made against an
ordinary person.
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As noted, the key to limiting the expansiveness of the virulence
rationale is to require that the concrete consequences used to justify
singling out a particular example of speech are not consequences
stemming from the listeners' reflective response to the antagonistic
ideas expressed by the speaker. The failure to limit the virulence exception in this way would in effect allow the virulence exception to
swallow the content- and viewpoint-neutrality rule. If the virulence exception is defined to include the listeners' generalized reactions to
the frightening ideas communicated by a speaker, then every dissenter speaking on a highly contentious issue will fall within the exception. If a listener's reflective reactions could justify fitting a
particular example of speech within the virulence exception, then the
Court would have upheld the statute at issue in .A.V-a statute involving hate speech of the most egregious sort, which would almost
always generate a hostile response by listeners reflecting on the message of that speech.
Limiting the virulence exception to situations involving a higher
magnitude of concrete consequences follows from an analysis already
familiar in the Court's time, place, and manner jurisprudence. In
Boos v. Barry, the Supreme Court struck down a District of Columbia
statute that prohibited "the display of any sign within 500 feet of a
foreign embassy if that sign tends to bring that foreign government
into 'public odium' or 'public disrepute.'"90 The Court held that the
91 The Court's rationale in
statute was impermissibly content-based.
Boos is consistent with a "concrete consequences" interpretation of the
first R.A. V exception: "Regulations that focus on the direct impact of
speech on its audience present a different situation [than contentneutral time, place, and manner regulations]. Listeners' reactions to
speech are not the type of 'secondary effects' we referred to in [earlier
cases] ."92 The justification for the regulation, in other words, can
have nothing to do with the content of the speech, but must rest entirely on the concrete consequences of the speech, such as traffic, congestion, or physical obstruction of a building. In the case of RA.V,
this means that the concrete consequences justifying singling out a
particular subset of unprotected speech must be the same type of concrete consequences-a fight, the magnitude of reaction to a threat,
etc.-thatjustify the denial of constitutional protection to the broader
category.
90
91
92

485 U.S. 312, 315 (1988).
Id. at 319.
Id. at 321.
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Ironically, the author of the Boos majority opinion was Justice
O'Connor-the same Justice O'Connor who wrote the majority opinion upholding the Virginia cross burning statute as a content-neutral
regulation of the unprotected category of "intimidation." 9 3 Unfortunately, by the time she wrote the majority opinion in Black, she seems
to have forgotten the lessons of her earlier opinion. There is simply
no way to interpret the Virginia intimidation statute singling out the
burning of a cross as anything but a regulation of the content of the
expressive message that the cross burning communicates. Justice
O'Connor even describes that message as reflecting "cross burning's
long and pernicious history as a signal of impending violence." 94
Logical inconsistencies aside, it is not terribly surprising that Justice O'Connor did not follow what seem to be the clear implications
of RA.V; she was one of the concurring Justices in the earlier case,
and thus was not a proponent of that case's analysis in the first place.
It is far more troubling, on the other hand, that the author of R.A. V
joined Justice O'Connor's analysis in Black and did not seem to notice
that the two opinions are inconsistent. Justice Scalia's Black concurrence devotes exactly one sentence to the RA.V. issue. 95 Justice Scalia
concludes curtly that RA.V. does not prevent the state of Virginia
from punishing speech involving a particular perspective on a particular subject matter-i.e., the unmistakably racist message communicated by a burning cross. Justice Scalia does not explain-nor for that
matter even discuss-why the state of Virginia was permitted to single
out and punish the expression of a particular viewpoint but the city of
St. Paul was not. This. leaves open the possibility that Justice Scalia
(and thus perhaps a majority of the Court) is now willing to abandon
or substantially modify the very basic rule against content and viewpoint discrimination embodied in RA.V-a radical change that deserves at least some justification. It would have been nice if the author
of the original doctrine would have said a few words to acknowledge
its passing.
III.

IF THIS

Is NOT

OVERBREADTH, THEN WHAT IS IT?

Justice Scalia may not have focused on the majority's deviation
from the central holding of HA.V because he was too busy fighting
93

See Virginia v. Black, 538 U.S. 343, 363 (2003).

94

Id.

95

See id. at 368 (Scalia,J., concurring in part, concurring in thejudgment in part,

dissenting in part) ("I agree with the Court that, under our decision in R.A.V. v. St.
Paul, a State may, without infringing the First Amendment, prohibit cross burning
carried out with the intent to intimidate." (citations omitted)).
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another battle. Justice Scalia's main focus in his Black concurrence
was the plurality's refusal to rely on the overbreadth doctrine tojustify
its holding that the Virginia statute was facially unconstitutional. Justice Scalia objected to this because under a straightforward application of the overbreadth doctrine the Court could not have held the
Virginia statute unconstitutional because the statute was not "substantially" overbroad. 96 Whether the plurality's treatment of the requirement that a statute be "substantially" overbroad deserves the level of
invective Justice Scalia directs at it97 is questionable, but to Justice
Scalia this isjust another battle in the continuing war within the Court
over the use of facial challenges to unconstitutional statutes generally.
Regardless of whether Justice Scalia's outrage is misplaced, many of
his criticisms do highlight another layer of confusion permeating Justice O'Connor's plurality opinion. The good news may be that this
portion of the Black decision may be the one real victory for the First
Amendment-and maybe for constitutional litigants in general-in
an otherwise fairly bleak result.
A.

The Fracas Over Facial Challenges

It is a daunting prospect even to attempt to succinctly describe
the dispute between the Black majority and Justice Scalia to those not
immersed in First Amendment lore. Recall the basic components of
the Virginia statute: the statute made it a crime to burn a cross "with
the intent of intimidating any person or group of persons," and then
made the burning of the cross "prima facie evidence of an intent to
intimidate a person or group of persons."9 8 In interpreting the prima
96 Id. at 375 (Scalia, J., concurring in part, concurring in the judgment in part,
dissenting in part) ("The notion that the set of cases identified by the plurality in
which convictions might improperly be obtained is sufficiently large to render the
statute substantially overbroad is fanciful.").
97 As usual in this sort of Justice Scalia opinion, he is not subtle. According to
Justice Scalia, the plurality's treatment of the overbreadth doctrine is "fanciful," id.
(ScaliaJ., concurring in part, concurring in the judgment in part, dissenting in part),
"alarming," id. at 376 (Scalia, J., concurring in part, concurring in the judgment in
part, dissenting in part), "shocking," id. at 377 (Scalia, J., concurring in part, concurring in the judgment in part, dissenting in part), "unjustified," id. at 378 (Scalia, J.,
concurring in part, concurring in the judgment in part, dissenting in part), "unprecedented," id. (Scalia, J., concurring in part, concurring in the judgment in part, dissenting in part), and "truly baffling," id. at 379 (Scalia, J., concurring in part,
concurring in the judgment in part, dissenting in part). All of which leads him to
conclude (somewhat inconsistently given the preceding jeremiad): "Words cannot express my wonderment at this virtuoso performance." Id. (Scalia, J., concurring in
part, concurring in the judgment in part, dissenting in part).
98 VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-423 (Lexis 2004); see supra note 4.
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facie evidence provision, the state trial judge in one of the cases
before the Supreme Court in Black had informed the jury that "[t] he
burning of a cross, by itself, is sufficient evidence from which you may
infer the required intent."99 The plurality in Black held that "because
of the interpretation of the prima facie evidence provision given by
the jury instruction, the provision makes the statute facially invalid at
this point."10 0 It was the statute's inference of an impermissible intent
to intimidate-not, as discussed in the previous section, the fact that
the statute singled out the burning of a cross-that rendered the statute unconstitutional under the First Amendment. The Court remanded for reconsideration by the Virginia State Supreme Court the
two cases involving the burning of a cross in the yard of a neighbor on
the "theoretical possibility that the court, on remand, could interpret
the provision in a manner different from that so far set forth in order
to avoid the constitutional objections we have described." 10 1 Then, to
confuse things further, the plurality affirmed outright the dismissal of
charges against the third defendant who had burned the cross at a
political rally, implicitly holding that no possible interpretation of the
statute could justify criminal sanctions against the third defendant's
10 2
expressive act.

Putting aside his verbal assault on the plurality, Justice Scalia correctly notes that it is confusing for the Black plurality to not rely explicitly on the overbreadth doctrine to strike down the Virginia statute
in light of the fact that the situation was tailor-made for the application of that common First Amendment claim. 103 Without an overbreadth claim, it is difficult to see what doctrine justifies the plurality
in holding that the statute is "facially invalid."' 04 One reason the Black
plurality may have been reluctant to rely on an overbreadth claim is
because it may have been difficult to satisfy the "substantial-overbreadth" limitation on overbreadth claims, which forces litigants raising such claims to muster far more evidence of unconstitutional
applications than (under the plurality's analysis described in Part II
supra) would have been possible in this case.10 5
99 Black, 538 U.S. at 364 (plurality opinion).
100 Id. at 367 (plurality opinion).
101 Id. (plurality opinion).
102 Id. at 367-68 (plurality opinion).
103 See id. at 373-76 (Scalia, J., concurring in part, concurring in the judgment in
part, dissenting in part).
104 See id. at 367 (plurality opinion).
105 See id. at 373-79 (Scalia, J., concurring in part, concurring in the judgment in
part, dissenting in part).
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By finding the Virginia statute "facially unconstitutional" without
relying on the overbreadth doctrine, the Black opinion may have
opened up an entire new avenue for litigants raising facial First
Amendment challenges against statutes restricting free speech. This
prospect is what exercised Justice Scalia. Justice Scalia's fears (and
First Amendment advocates' hopes) may be justified. This new avenue may render the classic overbreadth challenge redundant in a
large number of First Amendment free speech cases. To illustrate why
this is so important, it is necessary to take a brief detour into the morass of First Amendment overbreadth doctrine.
The overbreadth doctrine "prohibits the Government from banning unprotected speech if a substantial amount of protected speech
is prohibited or chilled in the process."1 0 6 The Court's conventional
explanation of the overbreadth doctrine has been to treat it as a kind
of specialized third-party standing rule that was created to guard
against the chilling effect of overly broad statutes regulating expression. "Litigants ... are permitted to challenge a statute not because

their own rights of free expression are violated, but because of ajudicial prediction or assumption that the statute's very existence may
cause others not before the court to refrain from constitutionally protected speech or expression."10 7 In more recent years, however, the
standing rules applicable to an overbreadth challenge have become
complicated in a way that limits the effectiveness of an overbreadth
claim and therefore undermines somewhat the original justification
for the overbreadth doctrine. According to the Court's current overbreadth standing rules, a plaintiff engaged in speech protected by the
First Amendment may raise only an as-applied challenge to an overbroad statute.10 8 The successful litigation of an as-applied overbreadth claim will result in a narrow ruling carving out that plaintiffs
expression from the reach of the statute, but leaving the statute as a
whole intact. 10 9 A plaintiff engaged in speech that is not constitutionally protected, on the other hand, may raise a facial challenge to the
106 Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coalition, 535 U.S. 234, 255 (2002).
107 Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601, 612 (1973). For the most famous critique of this explanation, see Henry P. Monaghan, Overbreadth, 1981 SuP. CT. REV. 1;
Henry P. Monaghan, Third Party Standing, 84 COLUM. L. REV. 277, 282-86 (1984)
[hereinafter Monaghan, Third Party Standing]. Monaghan argues that overbreadth
can easily fit within the standard first-party standing framework, and that the overbreadth doctrine is simply a reflection of the "special status of first amendment
claims[, which] reflects the high degree of means-ends congruence required under
substantive first amendment law, and not any distinctive standing concept."
Monaghan, Third Party Standing, supra, at 283.
108 Brockett v. Spokane Arcades, Inc., 472 U.S. 491, 504 (1985).
109 Id.
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statute, which if successful will result in the entire statute being struck
down.' 1 0 The counterintuitive aspect of these standing rules is that
the individual engaged in constitutional behavior is granted a narrower challenge to an unconstitutional statute than an individual who
is engaged in behavior that is unprotected by the constitution. By
prohibiting speakers engaged in constitutionally protected speech
from raising facial overbreadth claims, the rules effectively limit the
range of plaintiffs who can successfully stand in for others not before
the court whose speech is chilled by the existence of the statute,
thereby undercutting what the Court itself has identified as the original point of the overbreadth doctrine.
Limiting the availability of the overbreadth doctrine in this and
other ways 11 has become a recurrent theme in the Court's recent
First Amendmentjurisprudence. In this respect, the overbreadth doctrine has become caught up in a broader debate over the general use
of facial challenges to unconstitutional statutes. The overbreadth doctrine is a First Amendment-specific exception to the general rule that
a litigant challenging the constitutionality of a statute is limited to the
claim that the statute is unconstitutional as applied to the litigant's
own actions unless the litigant can demonstrate that the statute is unconstitutional in all circumstances, in which case the litigant can challenge the statute on its face. This broader principle-a.k.a. the
Salerno rule-is the subject of an ongoing dispute between Justice
Scalia and others on the Court. This dispute centers around the continuing validity of the following language from United States v. Salerno:
A facial challenge to a legislative Act is, of course, the most difficult
challenge to mount successfully, since the challenger must establish
that no set of circumstances exists under which the Act would be
valid. The fact that [a legislative] Act might operate unconstitutionally under some conceivable set of circumstances is insufficient to
render it wholly invalid, since we have not recognized an "overbreadth" doctrine outside the limited context of the First
12
Amendment.1
Justice Scalia is a strong supporter of this standard for facial challenges to unconstitutional statutes, and cites it in his Black opinion to
support his argument against the plurality's action in striking down
the Virginia statute on its face. 1 3 Justice Scalia considers judicial rec110 Id. at 503-04.
111 See infra notes 125-27 and accompanying text.
112 481 U.S. 739, 745 (1987).
113 Virginia v. Black, 538 U.S. 343, 373 n.2, 375 n.4 (2003) (Scalia, J., concurring
in part, concurring in the judgment in part, dissenting in part).
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ognition of facial challenges fundamentally incompatible with necessary limits on the Court's authority to exercise its power of judicial
review.' 1 4 Under this view, adherence to Salerno is necessary if the
courts are to avoid issuing unconstitutional advisory opinions.
Justice Scalia's perspective has not been adopted by a majority of
the Court, and various academic critiques have challenged the accuracy of Justice Scalia's basic contention that the as-applied challenge
has been the norm in constitutional adjudication and the facial challenge has typically been permitted only in very rare circumstances. At
least four current Justices have explicitly rejected the Scalia position.
Justice Stevens-who is by far the most vociferous critic of the Scalia
position-has called the Salerno rule "draconian" and argued that "Salerno's rigid and unwise dictum has been properly ignored in subsequent cases even outside the abortion context." 11 5 Justices Ginsburg
and Souter joined a plurality opinion written by Justice Stevens in
which Justice Stevens rejected the application of Salerno to a facial
challenge based on due process vagueness claims and concluded that
"the Salerno formulation has never been the decisive factor in any decision of this Court, including Salerno itself."'1 16 Justice O'Connor
disagreed with the application of Salerno
(joined by Justice Souter)1 has
7
in the abortion context.'
The weight of academic opinion also seems to be on the side of
Justice Stevens and others who reject the Scalia position. Among
others, Matthew Adler, Michael Dorf, and Marc Isserles have challenged Justice Scalia's assertions about the Court's hesitancy to consider facial challenges to unconstitutional statutes, and have also
disagreed with Justice Scalia about the theory behind Salerno.11 8 They
See City of Chicago v. Morales, 527 U.S. 41, 77 (1999) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
It seems to me fundamentally incompatible with this system for the Court
not to be content to find that a statute is unconstitutional as applied to the
person before it, but to go further and pronounce that the statute is unconstitutional in all applications. Its reasoning may well suggest as much, but to
pronounce a holding on that point seems to me no more than an advisory
and especially
opinion-which a federal court should never issue at all ....
should not issue with regard to a constitutional question, as to which we seek
to avoid even nonadvisory opinions....
Id. (citations omitted).
115 Janklow v. Planned Parenthood, 517 U.S. 1174, 1175 (1996) (Stevens, J., opinion respecting the denial of petition for writ of certiorari).
116 Morales, 527 U.S. at 55 n.22 (plurality opinion).
117 Women's Health Org. v. Schafer, 507 U.S. 1013, 1014 (1993) (O'Connor, J.,
concurring).
118 See, e.g., Matthew D. Adler, Rights Against Rules: The Moral Structure of American
ConstitutionalLaw, 97 MIcH. L. REv. 1 (1998); Michael C. Dorf, FacialChallenges to State
114
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have argued that the Court's willingness to consider facial challenges
to statutes is more a function of the nature of particular substantive
constitutional limits on statutes rather than a procedural limit on the
manner in which those statutes may be challenged. Professor Doff
argues further that all constitutional challenges to substantive regulations are in part facial challenges.11 9 Professor Adler goes the next
step and argues that " [t]
here is no such thing as a true as-applied constitutional challenge" since "every constitutional challenge involves the facial
scrutiny of rules" and "the court's task is to assess the predicate and

history of the underlying rule against one or more rule-validity
20
schema."1
Unfortunately, although Justice Scalia seems to be losing both the
intellectual battle over the logic of Salerno and the judicial battle over
the formal adoption of Salerno, his expressed desire to limit the
courts' ability to order the facial invalidation of statutes already permeates even the First Amendment overbreadth doctrine, which is supposed to be the one universally accepted exception to the Salerno rule.
Similar concerns about facial challenges to statutes have for many
years motivated the Court to impose limits on the application of the
overbreadth doctrine. Although everyone-apparently including Justice Scalia-continues to recognize that the overbreadth doctrine is
an exception to whatever general rule exists disfavoring facial challenges to unconstitutional statutes, the Court emphasized recently
that an overbreadth challenge to a statute unconstitutionally restricting speech "[r] arely, if ever, will . . .succeed against a law or regula-

tion that is not specifically addressed to speech or to conduct
necessarily associated with speech (such as picketing or demonstrating)." 2 1 Thus, in Virginia v. Hicks the Court rejected an overbreadth
and Federal Statutes, 46 STAN. L. REV. 235 (1994); Marc E. Isserles, Overcoming Overbreadth: FacialChallenges and the Valid Rule Requirement, 48 AM. U. L. REv. 359 (1998).
119 See Dorf, supra note 118, at 294 ("Every challenge to a statute is also facial in
that it attacks the statute that authorized the contested government action.").
120 Adler, supra note 118, at 157.
121 Virginia v. Hicks, 539 U.S. 113, 124 (2003). Efforts to limit facial challenges to
a narrow range of particular constitutional subjects got another boost in the Court's
recent opinion in Sabri v. United States, 541 U.S. 600 (2004). In Sabri, a defendant was
charged with violating a federal statute prohibiting bribery of state, local, or tribal
officials of entities that receive at least $10,000 of federal funds. See 18 U.S.C.
§ 666(a) (2) (2000). The defendant argued that the statute was facially unconstitutional because it did not require prosecutors to prove a direct link between the federal funds and the bribery, thus rendering the statute an unconstitutional exercise of
Congress's authority under the Spending Clause. See Sabri, 541 U.S. at 1945. Justice
Souter's majority opinion rejected the defendant's attempt to raise a facial challenge
to the statute. Justice Souter characterized the claim as an overbreadth claim and
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claim against a public housing trespassing statute. 12 2 The statute limited First Amendment activities such as leafletting in the public areas
of public housing project buildings. 123 The Court rejected the overbreadth challenge on the ground that the statute regulated a great
deal of activity not involving speech or expression. 124 Similar limits on
the use of the overbreadth doctrine would presumably apply to foreclose overbreadth claims in cases challenging, for example, the use of
public park regulations to limit speech in a quintessential public fostatutes to restrict exrum 125 or the enforcement of public indecency
126
dancing.
nude
as
such
pressive activity
concluded that "[f]acial challenges of this sort are especially to be discouraged." Id.
at 1948. Justice Souter went on to note that "we have recognized the validity of facial
attacks alleging overbreadth (though not necessarily using that term) in relatively few
settings, and, generally, on the strength of specific reasons weighty enough to overcome our well-founded reticence." Id. As examples of cases providing "weighty
enough" reasons, Justice Souter noted cases involving free speech, the right to travel,
abortion, and cases involving Congress's authority under Section 5 of the Fourteenth
Amendment. Id.
One of the strange things about the Court's decision in Sabri is that Justice
Scalia-who authored the language discouraging overbreadth challenges in the quotation accompanying this footnote-refused to join the portion of Justice Souter's

Sabri opinion that discouraged overbreadth challenges. Instead, Justice Scalia joined
Justice Kennedy's cryptic one-paragraph concurring opinion. Justice Kennedy re-

jected Justice Souter's discussion of overbreadth, and linked this rejection to other
cases in which the Court struck down federal statutes under the Commerce Clause.
Sabri, 124 S.Ct. at 1949 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part). There is a certain irony in

Justice Scalia implicitly endorsing facial overbreadth challenges in Commerce Clause
cases less than a year after his Hicks opinion limited the scope of the overbreadth
doctrine in the constitutional area that gave birth to the overbreadth doctrine. In any
event, the inconsistencies embedded in this dispute within the Court over the use of
the overbreadth doctrine lends support to Professor Richard Fallon's argument that
the availability of the doctrine has more to do with the substantive issues involved in a
case than with context-neutral litigation rules. See infra note 145 and accompanying
text.
122 Hicks, 539 U.S. at 124.
123 Id. at 121.
124 Id. at 123-24.
125 For an example of this logic, see Thomas v. Chicago Park District, 534 U.S. 316,
322 (2002) (holding that the First Amendment procedural safeguards of Freedman v.
MaTyland, 380 U.S. 51 (1965), cannot be the basis for a challenge to a city ordinance
regulating activity (including expression) in a public park because the ordinance "is
not even directed to communicative activity as such, but rather to all activity conducted in a public park").
126 Although the Court has held that nude dancing is protected expression under
the First Amendment, see Schad v. Borough of Mount Ephraim, 452 U.S. 61, 76 (1981), it
has on two separate occasions also upheld the use of general public indecency statutes
to regulate dancers at adult entertainment establishments. See City of Erie v. Pap's
A.M., 529 U.S. 277, 302 (2000) (plurality opinion); Barnes v. Glen Theatre, Inc., 501
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More importantly, for several decades the Court has limited the
overbreadth doctrine by requiring plaintiffs to prove that a law impermissibly regulating protected speech is "substantially overbroad." In
the Court's phrasing of this limitation, "the overbreadth of a statute
must not only be real, but substantial as well, judged in relation to the
statute's plainly legitimate sweep.' 1 2 7 Thus, the Court clearly intends
the "substantial" overbreadth analysis to be comparative in nature, but
the comparison is abstract, hypothetical, and largely governed by the
creativity of the lawyers in creating possible scenarios (involving both
protected and unprotected speech) that might be governed by the
statute. This is necessarily so because the entire point of an overbreadth challenge is to permit one plaintiff to raise a statute's potential constitutional problems with regard to the expression of other
speakers not before the court.
Thus, a judge faced with a substantial overbreadth challenge is
supposed to compare the plaintiffs examples of the statute's hypothetical applications to protected speech with the government's examples of the statute's hypothetical applications to unprotected speech
and reach some defensible conclusion about whether the statute's
prohibition of protected speech is "substantial ...judged in relation
to the statute's plainly legitimate sweep. '128 Even if the lawyers in an
overbreadth case could present anything approaching a representative sample of all the protected and unprotected expression governed
by the statute, the judge is still left with little guidance about the legitimate proportional coverage permitted by the First Amendment. Is a
statute constitutional if fifty percent of the speech prohibited by the
statute is constitutionally protected? Thirty percent? Ten percent?
Lower court judges are more or less on their own in this assessment
since the Supreme Court has never even attempted to articulate clear
rules about exactly how much of an unconstitutional effect is enough
to render a statute "substantially" overbroad "in relation to the statute's plainly legitimate sweep.' 1 29 It is little wonder that critics such as
Richard Fallon have characterized the empirical demands of the substantial overbreadth analysis as calling for "uncabined judicial speculation in areas that are, at best, on the outer fringes of the courts'
U.S. 560, 572 (1991). Neither of these cases produced a majority opinion or a clearcut holding. The basic message of both cases, however, is that a statutory mandate
that dancers wear, in the Court's technical terminology, "pasties and a g-string," does
not diminish the erotic message of the dancer's expression sufficiently to implicate
the First Amendment. See Pap'sA.M., 529 U.S. at 284.
127 Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601, 615 (1973).
128 Id.
129 Id.

2005]

CROSS

BURNING,

INTIMIDATION,

AND

FREE SPEECH

1319

practical competence." 130 Noting the contrary conclusions reached
by Justices Brennan and Scalia regarding the substantial overbreadth
of a child pornography statute, Fallon argues that neither Justice
could produce a sensible conclusion since "neither [Justice], understandably, was able to furnish anything approaching a numerical estimate-much less a reliable numerical estimate-of how many acts by
how many people, in any particular year, the statute might permissibly
and impermissibly reach."

13 1

Fallon argues that the proportionality analysis built into the modern overbreadth doctrine leads the courts to diminish the magnitude
132
But this criticism
of the state's interests in regulating some speech.
actually treats the substantial overbreadth doctrine as a liberalization
of First Amendment free speech protection. In fact, the clear thrust
of the requirement of "substantial" overbreadth is to limit overbreadth
claims, not make them easier to win.
One of the main practical problems with the substantial overbreadth requirement is that it is subject to easy manipulation. The
phrasing of the standard provides courts a simple mechanism to manipulate the analysis of a challenged law to undermine a substantial
overbreadth claim. An overbreadth claim can be undermined by simply broadening the scope of what "law" is being challenged. If a narrow construction of a challenged law leads to the conclusion that the
law regulates a substantial amount of protected speech, then courts
seeking to deny the First Amendment claim can easily reduce the percentage of protected speech covered by the law by simply interpreting
130 Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Making Sense of Overbreadth, 100 YALE L.J. 853, 894
(1991).
131 Id.
132 Fallon thus argues for a more direct balancing of interests in assessing the
overbreadth of a statute. That is, the courts should seek to assess "whether the state's
interest is truly compelling, and, if so, whether that interest justifies as much infringement on, and chilling of, protected speech as the statute effects." Id. at 895. While
this may be a more forthright approach to the problem of overbreadth, it does not
cure the indeterminacy problem Fallon notes in the proportionality analysis, and, if
anything, the Fallon approach may make that problem worse. Although the state
clearly has a compelling interest in applying criminal sanctions to the production of
child pornography, what does that strong interest tell us about the legitimacy of a
statute that is phrased broadly enough to criminalize the actions of a parent taking
innocent pictures of a child on a bearskin rug? See Osborne v. Ohio, 495 U.S. 103,
131 (1990) (Brennan, J., dissenting) (noting that an Ohio statute would make it a
criminal offense to possess "[p] ictures of topless bathers at a Mediterranean beach, of
teenagers in revealing dresses, and even of toddlers romping unclothed"). The quantitative factors measured in a proportionality analysis may be imprecise, but the qualitative factors involved in the Fallon comparative interest analysis cannot be measured
at all.
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the particular legal provision being challenged as part of a more comprehensive statutory scheme, the bulk of which does not prohibit constitutionally protected speech.
Within the last year, the Supreme Court provided an example of
how courts can deny a substantial overbreadth claim simply by broadening their focus of what law is being challenged. In Virginia v.
Hicks,' 33 the Court rejected an overbreadth challenge to a Richmond,
Virginia, public housing policy authorizing the police to serve notice
on any person lacking "a legitimate business or social purpose" for
being on the public housing project premises.1 34 Persons violating
this notice were subject to arrest for trespassing. The state courts had
found that the manager charged with carrying out this policy had imposed an unwritten rule "that demonstrators and leafleters obtain advance permission" before, engaging in expressive activity on public
housing property. 135 Based on this finding, the lower courts had held
the entire public housing statute unconstitutionally overbroad because the law had given the public housing manager too much discretion to grant or deny access.1 36 The Supreme Court disagreed,
holding that the Virginia court had focused too narrowly on the unwritten rule employed by the manager rather than the overall policy
prohibiting trespassing on public housing property. 13 7 The plaintiff's
overbreadth challenge could not succeed, the Court ruled, "unless the
trespass policy, taken as a whole, is substantially overbroad judged in
relation to its plainly legitimate sweep.' 38 The problem with this approach is that an overbreadth challenge is unlikely ever to succeed
against an explicitly speech-specific portion of a statute if the courts
routinely take into account the constitutional applications of the
other parts of the statute that are not concerned with expressive activity. If "substantial" overbreadth means demonstrating that a large
fraction of a law's applications are unconstitutional, then broadening
the definition of the "law" and therefore significantly increasing the
size of the denominator will by definition reduce the percentage of
unconstitutional applications and therefore thwart many substantial
39
overbreadth claims.1
133
134
135
136
137
138
139

539 U.S. 113 (2003).
Id. at 116.
Id. at 121.
Id. (citing Commonwealth v. Hicks, 563 S.E.2d 674, 680 (Va. 2002)).
Id. at 123-24.
Id. at 122.
Justices Souter and Breyer filed a brief concurrence in Hicks to note that the

Court did not decide "how to go about identifying the scope of the relevant law for

overbreadth analysis." Id. at 125 (Souter, J., concurring). In Hicks, Justice Souter
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The precise details of the various limitations recently imposed on
the overbreadth analysis are less important than the larger theme,
which is that the Court has significantly limited the overbreadth doctrine in recent decades and thereby made it significantly harder for
First Amendment plaintiffs to successfully litigate overbreadth claims.
This is why it is significant thatJustice O'Connor failed to employ the
overbreadth doctrine to strike down Virginia's cross burning statute.
Black may offer plaintiffs the prospect of facial First Amendment challenges to statutes in situations in which the plaintiffs cannot satisfy the
severe limitations of the substantial overbreadth doctrine. Unfortunately, it is unclear exactly what factors led the Court to grant the
facial challenge in Black, and more importantly, it is unclear what limitations the Court intends to impose on similar claims in the future.
From all appearances, the Black plurality intended to place no
limitations on facial challenges to statutes allegedly violating the First
Amendment. The particular problem identified by the plurality-that
juries could punish constitutionally protected instances of burning a
cross without the intent to intimidate-was not something that would
predictably occur in a significant number of cases. Thus, the unconstitutional element was not demonstrably "substantial" in the way that
the Court requires in a successful overbreadth challenge. Nor was the
type of constitutional violation in this case atypical, exceptionally severe, or especially onerous. The violation was a fairly typical example
of sloppy legislative drafting, which broadened the scope of the statute
just a few steps beyond what was permissible under the First Amendment. The statute simply provided insufficient guidelines to prevent
factfinders from punishing speakers whose expression was unpopular
but constitutionally protected, and also gave little guidance to speakers trying to figure out when they could use the burning cross as a
political statement and when they could not. In this way, Black was
analogous to a due process vagueness challenge, in which the Court
routinely permits facial challenges to prevent these sorts of
problems. 140 The point is that this was a fairly typical First Amendargued the plaintiff had not demonstrated substantial overbreadth even under a narrow definition of the relevant law. Id. (Souter, J., concurring).
140 See City of Chicago v. Morales, 527 U.S. 41, 60-64 (1999) (plurality opinion)
(holding unconstitutionally vague on its face a Chicago city ordinance prohibiting
"criminal street gang members" from loitering in public places); Kolender v. Lawson,
461 U.S. 352, 361-62 (1983) (holding unconstitutionally vague on its face a California
statute requiring persons loitering on streets to carry "credible and reliable" identification). In Morales, the plurality noted that "[w] hen vagueness permeates the text of
such a law, it is subject to facial attack" even if the challenge would not have met the
standards of the overbreadth doctrine. Morales, 527 U.S. at 55 (plurality opinion).
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ment challenge to a fairly typical regulation of speech. If a facial challenge can be used in this case, the argument goes, then it can be used
in virtually any First Amendment case.
The question remains: if this type of statute can be challenged
without complying with the substantive and procedural rules attending an overbreadth challenge, why would any plaintiff ever rely on the
overbreadth doctrine? Another question also comes to mind: if the
facial challenge here was permitted in the context of a fairly ordinary
case involving a statute that went just a bit too far into the realm of
constitutionally protected personal liberties, then why should the implicit permission to bring facial constitutional challenges granted by
Black be limited to First Amendment cases? Other than First Amendment cases, the Court has routinely permitted similar facial challenges
in only two other areas: due process vagueness cases 14 1 and abortion
cases. 14 2 Indeed, one of the main debates between Justice Scalia and
Justice Stevens over the meaning and applicability of the Salerno rule
arose in the context of a lower court's recognition that the Supreme
Court has permitted facial challenges to abortion regulations that violate the implicit constitutional right of privacy even in the absence of a
finding that the challenged statute is constitutional in "no set of circumstances." 143

Black may signal that the Court intends to broaden

the range of permissible constitutional bases for facial challenges to
statutes.
What the plurality does not say in Black may be as important as
what it does say. It is notable that the Black plurality does not respond
to Justice Scalia's Salerno salvos, and indeed does not even acknowledge that its facial unconstitutionality ruling is in any way extraordinary. The true significance of the facial unconstitutionality ruling in
Black may lie in its mundanity. Black may signal the Court's movement away from the artificial limits imposed on the overbreadth docThe plurality also described the two problematic characteristics of an unconstitutionally vague statute in a way that would apply to the statute in Black: "Vagueness may

invalidate a criminal law for either of two independent reasons. First, it may fail to
provide the kind of notice that will enable ordinary people to understand what conduct it prohibits; second, it may authorize and even encourage arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement." Id. at 56 (plurality opinion).
141 See supra note 140.
142 See, e.g., Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 895 (1992) (holding a
husband notification provision of the Pennsylvania abortion regulation unconstitutional on its face as a substantial obstacle to a woman's right to abortion "in a large
fraction of ... cases").

143 SeeJanklow v. Planned Parenthood, 517 U.S. 1174, 1175 (1996) (Stevens, J.,
opinion respecting the denial of petition for writ of certiorari); id. at 1176-81 (Scalia,
J., dissenting from the denial of certiorari).
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trine and toward a regime of constitutional litigation such as the one
described by Michael Dorf in which facial challenges are treated as
routine and are extended to all "nonlitigation fundamental rights"
(the bulk of which will involve the First Amendment or some aspect of
the unenumerated constitutional privacy right). 144 Or at least it may
move the Court toward embracing a constitutional litigation regime in
which (as Richard Fallon has suggested) the Court permits facial challenges based on a more substantive analysis of whether other constitutional doctrines may be just as important (and therefore just as worthy
of the strong medicine of facial invalidation) as the First Amendment
rule. 14 5
claims that produced the overbreadth exception to the Salerno
B.

The Good News: FacialRelief Was Granted; The Bad News: The
Wrong FacialRelief Was Granted

If the conclusions in the immediately preceding section accurately reflect the implications of Black, then facial challenges to unconstitutional statutes may have just become easier to bring and win.
This is good news to constitutional litigants in general and First
Amendment litigants in particular. But First Amendment litigants received bad news along with the good. The bad news is that the Court
granted facial relief in Black on the wrong grounds, or at least on a
rationale that had an implicit premise that may do great harm in future First Amendment cases.
The Black plurality held the Virginia statute unconstitutional on
the ground that the prima facie evidence provision of the statute unconstitutionally invited juries to infer the intent to intimidate from the
146 According to the pluralmere fact that a defendant burned a cross.
ity this was unconstitutional because the statute as written "does not
distinguish between a cross burning done with the purpose of creating
anger or resentment and a cross burning done with the purpose of
threatening or intimidating

a victim."

147

What initially sounds like a

strong statement favoring First Amendment protection of unpopular
speech in fact rests on an implicit premise that may undermine many
of the protections the Court has previously afforded to radical politi144 Dorf, supra note 118, at 269.
145 Richard H. Fallon, Jr., As-Applied and FacialChallenges and Third-PartyStanding,
113 HARv. L. REv. 1321, 1369 (2000) ("[T]he much controverted question whether
'overbreadth' doctrine should extend beyond the First Amendment is not a single
question, but a series of questions about which other constitutional values, if any,
should be afforded the type of protection that overbreadth doctrine currently provides to First Amendment values.").
146 Virginia v. Black, 538 U.S. 343, 347-48 (2003) (plurality opinion).
147 Id. at 366 (plurality opinion).
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cal advocacy. This implicit premise is that with a properly drafted statute requiring proof of the relevant intent, the government is
permitted to single out and apply criminal sanctions to particular examples of "intimidating" verbal or symbolic speech-today burning
crosses, tomorrow swastikas, the next day some other symbol of some
other radical political group that uses symbolic expression to put fear
into the hearts of its mainstream opponents.
The core of the Court's disturbing concession that governments
may mete out overtly content-based sanctions on speech is the Court's
reference to the unprotected category of "true threats."1 48 This reference is not that helpful, however, because the Court has never described in detail what speech falls into the category of "true threats."
The lower courts are very much of different minds on this matter, and
the Court passed up an opportunity to clarify the confusion less than
three months after it issued its opinion in Black when it refused to
review the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals's opinion upholding a
multi-million dollar judgment against anti-abortion activists who provided information to the operators of the Nuremberg Files website. 149
The Court's failure to clarify the category of "true threats" should give
speakers little solace about the parameters of the new subcategory of
"intimidating" speech. The Court's actions also should cause concern
about the future prospects of the traditional protection of political
dissent defined by Brandenburgv. Ohio.150 Black is another in a growing list of cases in which the courts have channeled political dissent
cases away from traditional free speech doctrine governing political
advocacy and into various netherworlds of alternative expressive constructs that provide little First Amendment protection or are deemed
to be outside the range of First Amendment protection altogether.
This trend suggests the possibility that the traditional category of political advocacy will increasingly become a constitutional artifact that will
ensnare only prosecutors and civil litigants who are too unsophisticated to recast their claims against speakers into one of the new alternative paradigms of speech regulation.
The next two Parts discuss this trend. Part IV addresses the many
problems attending the category of "true threats" and its new subset
"intimidation," and Part V addresses the larger problem presented by
the proliferation of constitutional pigeonholes for unprotected
speech.
148 See id. at 359-60.
149 See Planned Parenthood v. Am. Coalition of Life Activists, Inc., 290 F.3d 1058
(9th Cir. 2002), cert. denied, 539 U.S. 958 (2003).
150 395 U.S. 444 (1969) (per curiam).
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A THREAT?

The category of threats (or, as the Supreme Court likes to describe the relevant content, "true threats") is one of several categories
of speech (others include obscenity, libel, and fighting words) that the
Supreme Court has placed outside the protective boundaries of the
First Amendment. The specific reasoning behind the exclusion of
"true threats" from the First Amendment will be explored in this Part
and the next, but the Court's classic explanation for the exclusion of
threats and the other types of no-value speech is that "such utterances
are no essential part of any exposition of ideas, and are of such slight
social value as a step to truth that any benefit that may be derived
from them is clearly outweighed by the social interest in order and
15 1
morality."
I have detailed elsewhere the many problems with the Court's
2
current "true threats" jurisprudence,15 and I will not repeat that detailed critique here. I am concerned here with the additional
problems Black adds to the already unsatisfactory state of the Court's
"true threats" jurisprudence. In particular, I am concerned here with
the details of the new category (or injustice O'Connor's conception,
subcategory) of constitutionally unprotected "intimidating" speech,
and specifically how that the Court's amended "true threats"/intimidation jurisprudence affects the Court's political advocacy jurisprudence. The definitional dilemma is crucial to this analysis: if a
particular instance of speech is defined and categorized as intimidation or a "true threat," then that speech is wholly outside the First
Amendment and under the holding of Black may therefore be
targeted specifically by a criminal statute. If the same speech is defined and categorized as political advocacy, on the other hand, the
speech receives what for all practical purposes amounts to absolute
First Amendment protection under Brandenburgand its progeny. The
line between absolute constitutional protection and none at all is very
hazy. The deep ambiguity in the Court's sketchy efforts to demarcate
the various categories greatly increases the danger of ideologically motivated punishment of political dissenters-a prospect that supposedly
had been rendered difficult by the Court's renunciation of McCarthy-

151 Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 572 (1942).
152 See Steven G. Gey, The Nuremberg Files and the First Amendment Value of Threats,
78 TEX. L. REv. 541 (2000).
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ite censorship in the 1950s' 5 3 and virtually impossible by several important political speech decisions in the late 1960s. 1 54
A.

The Supreme Court and the Mysterious "True Threat"

As noted at the end of the last Part, the central problem with the
Supreme Court's renunciation of constitutional protection for threatening speech is that the Court has never defined an unprotected "true
threat." This oversight is magnified by the Court's new decision in
Black, which purports to subsume another undefined category of unprotected speech-intimidation-into the already mysterious larger
category. The situation is complicated further by the vast differences
in how lower courts treat "true threats." Some lower courts apply a
standard that is in some respects almost as rigorous as the Supreme
Court's political advocacy test, while other courts apply a standard that
affords expansive deference to a jury's virtually unguided determination of whether speech is sufficiently threatening to fall outside the
range of First Amendment protection. 155 Before turning to the new
twist provided by the concept of intimidation, a brief review of the
Court's "true threats" jurisprudence is necessary.
The Supreme Court has addressed the category of "true threats"
only long enough to identify a few examples of speech that the category does not contain. In its 1969 decision Watts v. United States, the
Court considered an appeal from a man convicted of violating the
federal statute prohibiting threats against the President.1 56 The basis
of this conviction was a statement the defendant made to a small
group of people attending an anti-Vietnam War rally in Washington,
D.C. This is the precise statement for which Watts was prosecuted:
"[I] have already received my draft classification as 1-A and I have got
to report for my physical this Monday coming. I am not going. If they
ever make me carry a rifle the first man I want to get in my sights is
L.BJ." 15 7 The Supreme Court overturned the conviction on First
153 See Yates v. United States, 354 U.S. 298 (1957) (reversing Smith Act convictions
of California Communist Party officials and significantly strengthening the lenient
First Amendment standard it had announced in its previous Smith Act decision, Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494 (1951)).
154 See Brandenburg,395 U.S. 444; Watts v. United States, 394 U.S. 705 (1969) (per
curiam); Bond v. Floyd, 385 U.S. 116 (1966).
155 See infra Part IV.B for a detailed description of the differing lower court

standards.
156

See 18 U.S.C. § 871 (a) (2000) (making it a criminal offense to "knowingly and

willfully" threaten "to take the life of... or to inflict bodily harm upon the President
of the United States").
157 Watts, 394 U.S. at 706.
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Amendment grounds, holding that although the presidential threat
statute was constitutional on its face, the statute's reach was limited by
First Amendment considerations.15 8 Thus, " [w] hat is a threat must be
distinguished from what is constitutionally protected speech." 159 The
Court concluded that the constitutionally unprotected category of
"true threats" did not include "the kind of political hyperbole indulged in by petitioner."' 160 The Court went on to insist that the category of "true threats" must be limited by the recognition that political
speech often would "include vehement, caustic, and sometimes unpleasantly sharp attacks" and frequently would be "vituperative, abusive, and inexact."' 61 These limitations on the category of "true
threats" are somewhat helpful, but although these descriptive terms
give some indication of what a "true threat" is not, they do little to tell
us what a "true threat" is. All we know from Watts is that nasty, abusive, and vehement political hyperbole is not the stuff of a "true
threat."
The Court's only other opportunity to assess the constitutional
parameters of the "true threat" is instructive because the Court considered language that to any layperson would constitute clear-cut threats.
The Court, however, treated this language as pure political speech deserving the highest protection offered by the Constitution. In NAACP
v. ClaiborneHardware Co., 16 2 the Supreme Court confronted threatening speech uttered in the context of a heated, multi-year economic
battle between white businesses and African American residents of a
small Mississippi town.1 63 The battle began over demands by the local
black community to end racial segregation in the local public schools,
164
the local police force, and the allocation of community services.
After the local white community resisted these demands, the NAACP
led an economic boycott of white-owned businesses. 16 5 Three years
after the boycott began, seventeen white businesses sued the NAACP
and several individual leaders of the boycott.' 6 6 The white businesses
brought their suit in state court under a common law tort theory of
malicious interference with business and sought to recover the reve158 Id. at 707-08.
159
160

Id. at 707.
Id. at 708.

161
162
163
164
165
166

Id. (quoting N.Y. Times, Co.v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 270 (1964)).
458 U.S. 886 (1982).
Id. at 889.
Id. at 889-90.
Id. at 900.
Id. at 890.
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nue lost because of the boycott. 16 7 The suit was tried by a chancellor
in equity, who awarded the plaintiffs over one million dollars in lost
business earnings and goodwill, interest, and attorney's fees. 168 The
Mississippi Supreme Court upheld the judgment and rejected the defendants' First Amendment claims by referring to the threats
doctrine:
The agreed use of illegal force, violence, and threats against the
peace to achieve a goal makes the present state of facts a conspiracy.
We know of no instance, and our attention has been drawn to no
decision, wherein it has been adjudicated that free speech guaranteed by the First Amendment includes in its protection the right to
169
commit crime.
There was substantial evidence to justify the Mississippi court's
conclusion. The boycott started in the mid-1960s. During the period
after Martin Luther King, Jr., was assassinated in April 1968, the boycott was tightened and took a violent turn. 7 0 After a young black
man was shot by a local policeman, Charles Evers-the Field Secretary
of the NAACP and a leader of the boycott17 1-gave a speech in which
he "stated that boycott violators would be 'disciplined' by their own
people and warned that the Sheriff could not sleep with boycott violators at night."'172 At another rally two days later, Evers stated: "'If we
catch any of you going in any of them racist stores, we're gonna break
your damn neck."173 To the several hundred members of the audi-

ence, this was not an empty promise. The boycott organizers organized "store watchers" to identify individuals breaking the boycott, and
the names of those breaking the boycott were read at meetings and
published in a boycott newsletter. 17 4 Acts of violence were directed
against some individuals breaking the boycott. These acts included
shots fired into houses, vandalism against property, fights, and other
nonlethal physical violence.' 7 5 Since Evers's speech plausibly could
be interpreted to invite such action, the Mississippi Supreme Court
understandably gave short shrift to his First Amendment defense. 176
167 Id. at 891-92.
168 Id. at 893.
169 NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware Co., 393 So. 2d 1290, 1301 (Miss. 1980), rev'd,
458 U.S. 886 (1982).
170 Claiborne Hardware Co., 458 U.S. at 901.
171 Id. at 898.
172 Id. at 902.
173 Id.
174 Id. at 903-04.
175 Id. at 904-06.
176 See supra note 169 and accompanying text.
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The United States Supreme Court gave Evers's First Amendment
claim a very different reception than it had received in the Mississippi
courts. A unanimous United States Supreme Court ruled that Evers's
speech was legitimate political advocacy protected in full by the First
Amendment. 17 7 The Court acknowledged that "there is no question
that acts of violence occurred," and also noted the obvious point that
the First Amendment does not protect acts of violence or threats of
immediate violence. 178 But in this case, the Court concluded, the
speech in question fell within the range of constitutionally protected
political advocacy. The Court gently acknowledged that Evers's statements about the possibility that his opponents' necks would be broken
"might have been understood as inviting an unlawful form of discipline or, at least, as intending to create a fear of violence, ' 17 9 but rejected the Mississippi court's conclusion that these comments could
be the basis for tort liability. In a now-famous section of Claiborne,the
Court incorporated the facially threatening speech into the Brandenburg political speech framework and converted the case into one in
which the entire result turned on the lack of an immediate violent
reaction to Evers's speech.1 80
The Brandenburganalysis for political speech has three elements.
Under Brandenburg,political advocacy loses its First Amendment protection only if the government can prove that the speaker (1) used
explicitly inciteful words; (2) spoke those words in a situation in which
violent or illegal action would immediately ensue in response to the
speaker's incitement (the clear and present danger element), and (3)
the speaker had the specific intent to instigate the illegal or violent
reaction."8 " The focus on immediacy is the legacy of the famous
Holmes and Brandeis dissenting and concurring opinions from
177 Claiborne Hardware, 458 U.S. at 916.
178 Id.
179 Id. at 927.
180 Id. at 928 ("The emotionally charged rhetoric of Charles Evers's speech did
not transcend the bounds of protected speech set forth in Brandenburg.").
181 The Brandenburg Court's phrasing of these three elements is rather opaque.
According to the Court, decisions leading up to Brandenburg
have fashioned the principle that the constitutional guarantees of free
speech and free press do not permit a State to forbid or proscribe advocacy
of the use of force or of law violation except where such advocacy is directed
to inciting or producing imminent lawless action and is likely to incite or

produce such action.
Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 447 (1969) (per curiam). The description in the
text is what this elusive language is generally construed to mean. See, e.g., Gerald
Gunther, Learned Hand and the Origins of Modern First Amendment Doctrine: Some Fragments of History, 27 STAN. L. Rxv. 719, 763 (1975) ("Brandenburgcombines the most
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Abrams v. United States,182 Gitlow v. New York,' 8 3 and Whitney v. California,18 4 and incorporates into modern law the central theme of those
opinions that, as Justice Holmes phrased the point, "[o] nly the emergency that makes it immediately dangerous to leave the correction of
evil counsels to time warrants making any exception to the sweeping
command, 'Congress shall make no law abridging the freedom of
speech."' 8 5 In Claiborne Hardware,no emergency existed because the
beatings did not immediately follow from Evers's speech. The fact
that the speech was phrased in the form of a contingent threat did not
alter the analysis:
In the course of [Evers's] pleas, strong language was used. If that
language had been followed by acts of violence, a substantial question would be presented whether Evers could be held liable for the
consequences of that unlawful conduct. In this case, however-with
[one possible exception]-the acts of violence identified in 1966
occurred weeks or months after the April 1, 1966, speech; the chancellor made no finding of any violence after the challenged 1969
speech. Strong and effective extemporaneous rhetoric cannot be
nicely channeled in purely dulcet phrases. An advocate must be
free to stimulate his audience with spontaneous and emotional appeals for unity and action in a common cause. When such appeals
do not incite lawless action, they must be regarded as protected
speech. To rule otherwise would ignore the "profound national
commitment" that "debate on public issues should be uninhibited,
18 6
robust, and wide-open."
ClaiborneHardwareshould be the case that definitively resolves the
dilemma of the "true threat." The Court was under no illusion about
either the speaker's threatening words or the violent circumstances in
which those threatening words were spoken and heard by the targets
of the speech. The message to Evers's followers and the targets of the
threatening language was clear: shop at the forbidden stores and you
will be beaten and publicly humiliated and/or have your property
damaged. The lower court spelled this out explicitly and the Supreme
Court took notice of the point. The lower court held that Evers and
the other defendants used "'[i] ntimidation, threats, social ostracism,
protective ingredient of the Masses incitement analysis with the most useful elements
of the clear and present danger heritage.").
182 250 U.S. 616, 624 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting).
183 268 U.S. 652, 672 (1925) (Holmes, J., dissenting).
184

274 U.S. 357, 372 (1927) (BrandeisJ., concurring).

185

Abrams, 250 U.S. at 630-31 (Holmes, J., dissenting).

186

NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware Co., 458 U.S. 886, 928 (1982) (quoting N.Y.

Times, Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 270 (1964)).
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vilification, and traduction"' to effectuate the boycott.1 87 The lower
court also held that "the volition of many black persons was overcome
out of sheer fear."' 88 Yet the United States Supreme Court held that
"[t]o the extent that the [Mississippi] court's judgment rests on the
ground that 'many' black citizens were 'intimidated' by 'threats' of
'social ostracism, vilification, and traduction,' it is flatly inconsistent
with the First Amendment"I 89-again, presumably because there was
no definitive evidence regarding the central Brandenburgelement of
immediacy. The unmistakable message of ClaiborneHardwareseems to
be that at least in the context of threatening language with political
overtones, a "true threat" is defined by the three elements of the Brandenburg test: the words must be explicit, the words must be spoken in a
context in which serious harm is imminent, and the speaker must possess the specific intent that the harm occur.
But if the Claiborne HardwareCourt intended to absorb the "true
threats" analysis into Brandenburg,they stopped just short of saying so.
The Court's language coupled with the clear facts may leave no other
plausible interpretation, but there is no explicit statement to that effect in the Court's opinion. This leads to the puzzle of Black, in which
the Court focuses most of its attention on only one aspect of Brandenburg: the speaker's intent to intimidate. Meanwhile, the lower courts
have mostly refused to provide Brandenburg-style protection to verbal
messages with threatening overtones. So what is one to make of Claiborne Hardware? If Claiborne Hardwaredoes not provide the standard
for defining "true threats," what is the standard? And if the standard
falls short of Brandenburg,then why was the lower "true threats" standard not applied to Charles Evers? All of these questions are rhetorical, because the Supreme Court persists in its refusal to confront the
"true threats" dilemma directly. A glance at the competing lower
court standards will illustrate why the clarification of this issue by the
Supreme Court is long overdue.
B.

"True Threats" and the Lower Courts

It would be a serious understatement to say that in the absence of
Supreme Court guidance the lower courts have developed no consistent standard to measure a "true threat." The unfortunate reality is
that the standards used in various courts stretch from one end of the
187 Id. at 921 (quoting NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware Co., 398 So. 2d 1290, 1300
(Miss. 1980)).
188 Id. (quoting NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware Co., 398 So. 2d 1290, 1300 (Miss.
1980)).
189 Id.
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protective continuum to the other. On the protective end of the continuum is the approach used by the Second Circuit, which stops short
of providing Brandenburg-level protection, but nevertheless insists on
some evidence that the speaker used words communicating an imminent harm before being prosecuted for expressing a "true threat."' 90
Also located somewhere on the protective end of the continuum, the
Sixth Circuit uses a standard that focuses on evidence specifically relating to the idiosyncratic nature of a threat as an instrument to coerce a change in the target's behavior. 19 1 In the absence of proof that
the speaker engaged in the expression with that specific intention, the
Sixth Circuit will not place the speech in the unprotected "true
threats" bin. At the censorial end of the continuum, on the other
hand, is the standard used by the Ninth Circuit. For all practical purposes, the Ninth Circuit standard provides no consistent or systematic
constitutional protection of any sort for speakers using words that
could be reasonably construed (in the vernacular sense of the term
rather than any specialized legal sense) as threatening. 19 2 These
courts cannot even agree on whether the constitutional standard applied to "true threats" of a political nature are related to Brandenburgstyle political speech protections, much less on how to apply or modify
the components of Brandenburgto fit the special needs of regulating
threatening speech.
This background of ongoing disputes over the breadth of the
"true threats" doctrine in the lower courts does not inspire confidence
regarding these same courts' abilities to consistently apply the new
"intimidation" twist on the "true threats" doctrine introduced by
Black. At best, lower courts will simply treat the new subcategory of
intimidation as indistinguishable from the "true threats" category to
which, according to Justice O'Connor, it belongs. At worst, lower
courts that have been hostile to claims of constitutional protection for
generically threatening speech (in particular the Ninth Circuit) may
read Black as confirming the legitimacy of their refusal to acknowledge the implications of Claiborne Hardware. Even worse, the Ninth
Circuit and other courts taking their cue from the Ninth Circuit may
take Black as their signal to extend the scope of the "true threats"
category of unprotected speech beyond the context of speech targeting particular, identifiable victims. If the lower courts take the latter
tack, then there is a serious risk that Black will undermine Brandenburg
and the Brandenburglegacy of near-absolute protection of antagonistic
190
191
192

See infra note 199 and accompanying text.
See infra note 215 and accompanying text.
See infra notes 219-53.
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political speech. These possibilities will be explored further after a
brief review of the three major approaches to the concept of "true
threats" in the lower courts.
The Second Circuit Court of Appeals uses one of the most protective standards for "true threats" of any federal circuit, although the
Second Circuit standard falls far short of the level of protection offered to political speech under Brandenburg and Claiborne Hardware.
The Second Circuit announced its standard almost three decades ago
in United States v. Kelner.1 93 Like Claiborne Hardware, the threatening
speech in Kelner had strong political overtones. The case involved a
prosecution brought under the federal threats statute. 194 The defendant was a member of the Jewish Defense League who threatened to
kill Yasser Arafat during Arafat's 1974 visit to the United Nations in
New York City. The threat was made during a press interview in which
the defendant was seated at a table dressed in military fatigues with a
gun on the table in front of him.1 9 5 The defendant stated that "we are
planning to assassinate Mr. Arafat," and made several other equally
explicit statements indicating that the details of the assassination had
already been arranged.

19 6

The defendant's defense to the prosecution was based on the argument that the threats were never serious because they were simply
defensive in nature. According to the defendant Kelner, "his sole objective was to show the PLO that 'we (as Jews) would defend ourselves.' 197 Kelner's alternative free speech argument asserted that
under Watts his speech was nothing more than "political hyperbole." 19 8 The court rejected both of these claims and held that the
speech in question fell within the unprotected category of "true
threats." Although the defendant lost his free speech claim, the standard announced by the court was very protective of free speech values:
"So long as the threat on its face and in the circumstances in which it
is made is so unequivocal, unconditional, immediate and specific as to

193 534 F.2d 1020 (2d Cir. 1976).
194 See id. at 1020 (involving 18 U.S.C. § 875(c), which makes it a federal criminal
offense to "transmit[ ] in interstate or foreign commerce any communication containing any threat... to injure the person of another").
195 Id. at 1021.
196 Id. ("'We have people who have been trained and who are out now and who
intend to make sure that Arafat and his lieutenants do not leave the country alive ....
Everything is planned in detail."').
197 Id. at 1021-22.
198 Id. at 1024.
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the person threatened, as to convey a gravity of purpose and imminent prospect of execution, the statute may properly be applied." 199
By requiring proof of what the Kelner court called "qualities of
unequivocal immediacy and express intention," 200 the court effectively crafted a kind of weak Brandenburgsurrogate for the identification of a "true threat." Two of the three Brandenburgelements are
present in the Second Circuit's standard: an explicitness requirement
that is analogous to Brandenburg'sincitement component and a weakened intent analysis to ensure that the speaker really did intend to
initiate the relevant harm. The third Brandenburgelement-the immediacy/clear and present danger element-is not part of Kelner.
The court held that in prosecuting a "true threats" case the government does not have to prove that the defendant has "a present ability
to carry out his threat."20 1
The Kelner court focused much of its attention on the intent element. The Second Circuit rejected the defendant's argument that he
could be convicted of issuing a threat only if the government proved
that he specifically intended to carry out the threat. 20 2 The court held
instead that speech could be prosecuted as a threat based on evidence
that the speaker intended the speech to induce fear in the target,
even if the speaker had no intention of following through on the
threat. 20 3 In Watts the Supreme Court expressed "grave doubts"
about a similarly lax interpretation of the intent requirement by the
lower court in that case. 20 4 The Second Circuit nevertheless insisted
that this intent standard satisfied the First Amendment because it required some proof of the speaker's "gravity of purpose." 20 5 Even if
that is so, the Kelner intent requirement will often be inferred from
the speech itself-especially if the defendant does not testify and
there is no extrinsic evidence about the speaker's intent. Since the
defendant's threatening intention will often turn on the nature of the
threatening communication, the explicitness requirement provides
the real teeth in the Kelner standard. Under a rigorous application of
Kelner, a factfinder should not be able to infer a "true threat" from
speech that on its face does not specifically announce the speaker's
desire to harm or coerce some specified target. As with the similar
incitement element of Brandenburg, this explicitness requirement
199

Id. at 1027.

200

Id.

201
202
203
204
205

Id. at 1023.
Id. at 1024-25.
Id. at 1026.
See Watts v. United States, 394 U.S. 705, 708 (1969) (per curiam).
Kelner, 534 F.2d at 1026.
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functions as a mechanism with which appellate courts can check overreaching juries and limit the scope of "true threat" prosecutions to a
fairly narrow range of precise expressive acts.
Unfortunately, the Kelner standard has not always worked so protectively. In more recent cases the Second Circuit has not been particularly vigilant in enforcing the key limitation of Kelner. In United States
v. Malik, for example, the Second Circuit interpreted the Kelner standard to permit trial courts to submit to juries ambiguously threatening
statements if extrinsic evidence was introduced to bolster inferences
20 6
that the expression was intended to convey a threatening message.
Although the facts of Malik were very different than Kelner-Malik
involved a personal threat communicated privately in a letter rather
than the Kelner scenario of threatening language incorporated into a
political statement communicated to the world at large at a public
news conference-nothing in the language of the court's Malik opinion limits its interpretation of Kelner to that context.
A more meaningful intent requirement can be found in the second major lower court variation on the theme of the "true threat." In
United States v. Alkhabaz, 20 7 the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals addressed the parameters of the same federal threats statute applied by
the Second Circuit in Kelner. The case involved an e-mail exchange
between Alkhabaz-a University of Michigan student who also was
known as Jake Baker-and an anonymous Canadian named Arthur
Gonda. 20 8 The e-mails were discovered when authorities investigated
a fictional rape fantasy posted by Alkhabaz on the "alt.sex.stories" newsgroup. 209 The e-mails contained explicit references to the authors'
2 10 Alkhabaz
interest in committing various acts of sexual violence.
and Gonda only sent the e-mails to each other, and neither person did
21
anything to carry out any of their violent fantasies. i After its investigation, the government decided not to prosecute Alkhabaz for the
fictional story he posted on the newsgroup, but brought charges
21 2
under the federal threats statute based on several of the e-mails.
206 16 F.3d 45, 50 (2d Cir. 1994) ("Once sufficient extrinsic evidence, capable of
showing beyond a reasonable doubt that an ordinary and reasonable recipient familiar with the context of the letter would interpret it as a threat, has been adduced the
trial court should submit the case to the jury.").
207 104 F.3d 1492 (6th Cir. 1997).
208 United States v. Baker, 890 F. Supp. 1375, 1379 (E.D. Mich. 1995), affd sub
nom. United States v. Alkhabaz, 104 F.3d 1492 (6th Cir. 1997). The name Arthur
Gonda was apparently a nom de plume, and Gonda was never identified or found.
209 Id.
210 The e-mails are summarized in the district court's opinion. See id. at 1387-90.
211 Id. at 1379.
212 Id. at 1380.
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The district court granted the defendants' motion to quash the
indictments, holding that the e-mails could not meet the Kelner "unequivocal, unconditional, immediate and specific" requirement because both the intended victims and the intended action were too
imprecise.2 1 3 The court of appeals affirmed the dismissal of the indictments, but on different grounds. The court of appeals chose to
discuss the meaning of a threat in the context of interpreting the
terms of the statute, rather than providing a direct analysis of the First
Amendment concept of "true threats.

'2 14

Nevertheless, the Sixth Cir-

cuit's statutory interpretation is instructive in understanding the
proper constitutional analysis of these issues because identical factors
are at the root of the constitutional distinction between "true threats"
and protected speech. The key to the Sixth Circuit panel's approach
to the problem is the court's focus on the nature of a threat as language intended "to have some effect, or achieve some goal, through
intimidation."2' 5 Based on this understanding of the nature of a
threat, the appellate court held that the simple proof that a speaker
intended to do bodily harm was insufficient. Instead, the court held
that in order to prove a threat, the government must prove that the
speaker's serious intention to do bodily harm was actually communicated to someone who would perceive such expression as threaten2 16
ing.

The relevant intention, in other words, is not the intention to

communicate a threat, but the desire to communicate a threat in order to obtain some concrete benefit or response from the victim. Although this may seem like an academic distinction, it may be very
important in cases where the threatening speech is embedded in an
overheated political diatribe. In such cases it will often be the case
that the speaker has no reasonable cause to believe that the object of
the speaker's wrath would do anything in response to the speech. In
such cases, the threatening language is-much like the use of the
word "fuck" in Cohen v. California 21 7-simply a way of communicating
the intensity of the speaker's feelings about the speaker's political
opponent.
213 Id. at 1389-90.
214 United States v. Alkhabaz, 104 F.3d 1492, 1493 (6th Cir. 1997).
215 Id. at 1495.
216 Id.
217 403 U.S. 15, 26 (1971) (holding that the First Amendment protects the phrase
"fuck the draft" sewn onto the back of ajacket worn in a courthouse, and noting that
"[Me cannot sanction the view that the Constitution, while solicitous of the cognitive
content of individual speech, has little or no regard for that emotive function which,
practically speaking, may often be the more important element of the overall message
sought to be communicated").
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The Sixth Circuit panel upheld the dismissal of the indictments
against Alkhabaz and Gonda because the threatening communications were never communicated to anyone except the two correspondents themselves, and therefore could not possibly satisfy the intent
element of a threat. 21 8 As will be discussed below, the Sixth Circuit's
use of the term "intimidation" is very different from the use of the
same term by the Supreme Court in Black. The Sixth Circuit used the
term "intimidation" to refer to the speaker's intent and the nature of
the communication. In the Sixth Circuit's usage, the term "intimidation" limits the application of the concept of a threat to situations in
which there is objective evidence that speech was undertaken with specific goals and specific targets in mind. The generalized language or
symbols of intimidation (for example, a generic cross burning at a
political rally) would not be sufficient to satisfy the Sixth Circuit's standard, nor would the use of any threatening speech in a Claiborne Hardware-type situation involving public, nonspecific expression to a
diverse and generalized audience.
The Sixth and Second Circuits approach the concept of threats
from different angles and introduce different types of First Amendment protection for speech containing threatening elements. The
Sixth Circuit focuses on the need for evidence that the speaker specifically intended to induce an immediate response from the target of the
threat; the Second Circuit (at least in Kelner, if not always in subsequent cases) focuses on the need for evidence of explicitly threatening language. Both courts, however, are addressing the same
problem: the persistent possibility that prosecutors and civil litigants
will use civil and criminal statutes to punish abrasive, insulting, and
vulgar speech simply because that speech contains intimidating
overtones.
Unfortunately, one of the most prominent recent cases addressing the nature of the standard for "true threats" proceeds as if the
possibility of censorship through litigation does not exist. The Ninth
Circuit Court of Appeals has issued a large number of decisions involving threats, and the standard used in these decisions provides a very
low level of First Amendment protection for threatening speech. The
Ninth Circuit's most recent decision on the subject reaffirms this unprotective approach and affirms a civil verdict that exemplifies the potential abuses of the "true threats" concept.
The recent en banc decision upheld a multi-million dollar verdict
against anti-abortion activists who collected and then disseminated information about abortion providers on posters and the "Nuremberg
218

See Alkhabaz, 104 F.3d at 1496.
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Files" website.2 1 9 The case involved a civil action brought under a provision of the federal Freedom of Access to Clinic Entrances Act
(FACE), which gives individuals and groups a right of action against
anyone who by "threat of force .. .intentionally ... intimidates ...
any person because that person is or has been ...providing reproductive health services." 220 The case was brought against several antiabortion individuals and groups by four physicians and two health
clinics that provide abortion services.2 2 1 The plaintiffs claimed that
the defendants had intimidated them by producing and distributing
anti-abortion literature. 222
The entire case was based on three pieces of expressive material:
first, a "Deadly Dozen" poster, which contained the names of thirteen
doctors who provide abortion services and was captioned "GUILTY
OF CRIMES AGAINST HUMANITY."223 The poster also included the
home addresses of three of the doctors, and offered a $5000 reward
for "information leading to the arrest, conviction, and revocation of
license to practice medicine." 224 Another poster contained the name
of a single doctor, with a similar "GUILTY' caption and a reward offer. Third, and most famously, the "Nuremberg Files" website contained a litany of graphic anti-abortion material (such as drippingblood graphics and repeated epithets such as "baby butchers" and "Satan"), along with a list of over 400 doctors, judges, politicians, law enforcement officials, and other abortion-rights supporters. 225 The list
of names included some doctors who had been killed because of their
work. The list reflected this fact by identifying living and working individuals in black font, wounded individuals in gray font, and striking
through the names of individuals who had been killed. 226 Some of
the many ironies of what became known in the popular press as the
219 Planned Parenthood v. Am. Coalition of Life Activists, 290 F.3d 1058, 1062
(9th Cir. 2002) (en banc), cert. denied, 539 U.S. 958 (2003).
220 18 U.S.C. § 248(a) (1) (2000).
221 Am. Coalition of Life Activists, 290 F.3d at 1062.
222 Id.
223 Id. at 1064.
224 Id. at 1065.
225 Id. A mirror of the website is still available at http://www.xs4all.nl/-oracle/
nuremberg/aborts.html, though it is no longer maintained by anti-abortion activists.
The list is a particularly haphazard collection of names. It includes a random sample
of government officials, in addition to individuals directly involved with the provision
of abortion services, and a list of all present and some former Supreme CourtJustices.
The list ofJustices inexplicably includes the name Byron White-who was one of only
two dissenters to the Court's decision in Roe v. Wade. See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113,
221 (1973) (White, J., dissenting).
226 Am. Coalition of Life Activists, 290 F.3d at 1065.
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Nuremberg Files case is that none of the defendants were responsible
for posting the Nuremberg Files website (although the defendants apparently provided the names that were eventually posted on the
site 2 27), the person who was responsible for posting the site-Neal

Horsely-was never sued, 228 and a mirror of the website itself is still
9
available, although Mr. Horsely no longer maintains it.22 In the end,
the jury ruled in favor of the plaintiffs and awarded the plaintiffs approximately $120 million. 230 This figure included over a half million
dollars in compensatory damages for the FACE violations, over $108
million in punitive damages for the FACE violations, and over eleven
million dollars for violations of the federal racketeering laws in connection with the activity that violated the intimidation section of
23 1
FACE.
After a Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals panel reversed the jury's
23 2 the Ninth Circuit granted reverdict on First Amendment grounds,

233
The court treated the ishearing en banc and upheld the verdict.

sue of whether someone intended to "intimidate" under FACE as
coextensive with whether the speech in question constituted a "true
2 34 The problem for the court
threat" under the First Amendment.
was that the speech in question did not fit the traditional model of
threatening speech. First, the speech was not phrased in the terms of
a threat. As the court acknowledged, none of the speech in question
233 Also, there was no alleincluded "explicitly threatening language."
gation that any of the defendants had ever carried out any of the alleged threats, intended to carry out the threats, or had any
relationship with anyone else who intended to carry out the threats.
The court skirted this problem by simply holding that such proof was
unnecessary. "It is the making of the threat with intent to intimi236
In the
date-not the implementation of it-that violates FACE."

end, however, the court was confronted with little more than repeated
instances of aggressive, overwrought, and tasteless political protest.
227
228
229
230
231
232
2001),
233
234
235
236

Id.
Id.
See supra note 225.
Am. Coalition of Life Activists, 290 F.3d at 1066 n.4.
Id.
Planned Parenthood v. Am. Coalition of Life Activists, 244 F.3d 1007 (9th Cir.
vacated and reh'g en banc granted, 268 F.3d 908 (9th Cir. 2001).
Am. Coalition of Life Activists, 290 F.3d 1058.
Id. at 1071.
Id.
Id. at 1077.
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The use of specific names on the posters and website did nothing
to alter the highly political nature of the speech at issue in the case.
All of the speech in question was organized around a blunt and inelegant attempt to link the provision of abortion services with the extermination of Jews and other minorities by the Nazis. This linkage was
explicit in many of the documents2 37 and in the website. 238 The very
name "Nuremberg Files" highlights the theme. Thus, the listing of
names was not gratuitous in light of the nature of the protest. From
the peculiar perspective of the speakers-who expressed the view that
abortion is genocide subject to subsequent prosecution when the
world comes to its senses-the listing of the names was a crucial component of the protest. From the perspective of the protesters, it would
be hard to develop "evidence" for future "trials" without talking about
specific "defendants."
The Ninth Circuit dealt with all this by going beyond the particular defendants and their specific expressive acts. Instead, the court
treated the defendants' speech as if it were intimately related to other
examples of similar speech, and also as if the defendants' speech were
intimately related to violent acts that occurred in other places at other
times after other episodes in which similar posters were circulated by
other people. 2 39 The Ninth Circuit upheld the jury's conclusion that
the defendants' speech constituted a "true threat" because the jury
was justified in taking into account other examples of similar speech
engaged in by other persons at other times.
The Ninth Circuit reached this conclusion by a strange and convoluted route. The court implicitly acknowledged that if viewed alone
the posters and website would not necessarily constitute a "true
threat." 240 According to the court, it was the overall context of antiabortion violence that made the posters and website problematic. 24 1
237 See id. at 1064 (quoting the "Deadly Dozen" poster as stating that "'[a]bortion
was provided as a choice for Eastern European and Jewish women by the (Nazi) National Socialist Regime, and was prosecuted during the Nuremberg Trials (1945-46)
under Allied Control Order No. 10 as a "war crime""').
238 Id. at 1080 (quoting the website's references to the inability to prosecute many
Nazis at the post-World War II Nuremberg trials due to the loss of evidence, and
noting the website's conclusion that "[w]e do not want the same thing to happen
when the day comes to charge abortionists with their crimes . . . [and w]e anticipate
the day when these people will be charged in PERFECTLY LEGAL COURTS once the
tide of this nation's opinion turns against child-killing (as it surely will)").
239 See id. at 1085 (explaining that the defendants' distribution of posters constituted threats because they fit the "poster pattern"-the distribution of a poster followed by a killing-established in other jurisdictions).
240 Id. at 1079.
241 Id.
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With regard to the posters, the court emphasized that in other places
two doctors named Gunn and Britton had been shot after posters had
circulated that were similar to the ones distributed by the Nuremberg
Files defendants identifying a doctor named Crist. The court noted:
"Even if the Gunn poster, which was the first 'WANTED' poster, was a
purely political message when originally issued, and even if the Britton
poster were too, by the time of the Crist poster, the poster format itself
242
had acquired currency as a death threat for abortion providers."
With regard to the website, the court noted that although the site
named several hundred individuals, it grouped the individual names
together in only a few categories. The court found it significant that
one of the categories singled out "Abortionists" and also that the site
noted through the use of strikeouts and gray fonts that some on the
list had been killed or wounded.

243

Why any of this matters is unclear. With regard to the posters,
the Ninth Circuit majority opinion omits some crucial information
about the use of "Wanted"-style posters prior to the Nuremberg Files
litigation. Although, as the court emphasizes, it is true that previous
posters had included the names of individual doctors who were later
killed, in only one prior instance was a person who produced a poster
also connected with the killing. 244 Even if it is true that the identification of abortion doctors on the posters facilitated some of the other
killings, the significant element of the prior expression that facilitated
the illegal action was the identification of the doctors, not the use of
"Wanted"-style posters to communicate the relevant information.
Yet the Ninth Circuit upheld the jury's assessment of liability
based on the particular expressive vehicle used to communicate the
information-the particular style of posters-rather than the singular
fact that the defendants communicated the doctors' names. There is
a clear reason for the court's decision to emphasize the mode of the
communication instead of the information being communicated.
Presumably nothing in the Ninth Circuit's opinion would justify another jury's decision to issue a similar "true threats" ruling against a
newspaper that printed the names of doctors providing abortions.
Thus, the Ninth Circuit constructs a legal landscape in which dangerous information can be printed without fear of liability by speakers
who do not use the "Wanted" poster style and do not express hostility
toward the actions of the named individuals, but the very same dangerous information cannot be communicated by anyone using the dis242
243
244

Id.
Id. at 1080.
See id. at 1090-91 (Kozinski, J., dissenting).
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favored format and expressing hostility toward the actions of the
named individuals. Prior to the Nuremberg Files litigation, "Wanted"style posters had become a common expressive vehicle for protesting
abortion. After the Nuremberg Files decision, anti-abortion protesters
will use this particular form of expression at their peril. So much for
"the usual [First Amendment] rule that governmental
bodies may not
prescribe the form or content of individual expression." 245
As for the website, it is unclear why the court relied on the fact
that the hundreds of names on the site were categorized into groups.
The inclusion of categories in no way added to the danger inherent in
publishing the individual names, nor did it in any way communicate
any greater degree of hostility toward one category of names rather
than another. All of the names on the website are listed as potential
"defendants" in a future Nuremberg-style "trial." It is also unclear why
the notation of killed and wounded doctors made the list of names
more dangerous or threatening. The notations were certainly tasteless. The notations were an expression of the website author's vulgar
gloating over the tragic murder of his political opponents. But under
no conception of the First Amendment could the government punish
the expression of either tastelessness or the unseemly pleasure over
the misfortunes of others. "[I] t is largely because governmental officials cannot make principled distinctions in this area that the Constitution leaves matters of taste and style so largely to the individual. ''2 46
On the other hand, the notation could be construed more ominously as statements of approval of the illegal action of killing the
doctors. But we know from the modern political speech cases that the
First Amendment protects expression praising the illegal actions of
others. In the early days of the twentieth century, Eugene V. Debs was
sent to federal prison for ten years for praising the actions of young
men who illegally refused to be conscripted to fight in World War l.247
Almost fifty years later, the Court reversed field and refused to allow
the Georgia legislature to refuse to seat the young state Senator-elect
Julian Bond because Bond had issued press releases on behalf of a
civil rights organization praising the refusal of young men to be conscripted to fight in Vietnam. 248 So the website's praise for the illegal
activities of others could not be the basis for legal liability. Finally,
and most ominously, one could even go so far as to argue that the
website was advocating more killings. But even if the latter interpreta245
246
247
248

Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 24 (1971).
Id. at 25.
See Debs v. United States, 249 U.S. 211 (1919).
See Bond v. Floyd, 385 U.S. 116 (1966).
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tion were correct, the advocacy certainly could not satisfy the immedi2 49
ate harm requirement of Brandenburgand Claiborne Hardware.
At the end of the day, the Ninth Circuit has very little to support
its case that the speech in question constituted a "true threat." There
was no threatening language, the authors did not indicate any intent
to carry out the unstated threat, and the court implicitly conceded
that it was most concerned about the form in which the dangerous
information was expressed rather than the communication of the dangerous information itself. The verdict against the speakers was upheld
despite this flimsy evidence because the Ninth Circuit operates within
a conceptual standard for judging "true threats" that essentially provides factfinders with unfettered discretion to view speech as dangerous or threatening. This standard is devoid of objective constraints of
the sort that is routinely deemed necessary in the political advocacy
context to protect the expression of unpopular speech. The Ninth
Circuit standard for "true threats" is a simple reasonableness test:
"Whether a particular statement may properly be considered to be a
threat is governed by an objective standard-whether a reasonable
person would foresee that the statement would be interpreted by
those to whom the maker communicates the statement as a serious
2
expression of intent to harm or assault."

50

This standard imposes no significant limits on the ability of judicial factfinders to characterize political speech as a "true threat." Unlike the Second Circuit's Kelner standard, the Ninth Circuit does not
insist that a threat be "unequivocal, unconditional, immediate and
specific as to the person threatened, as to convey a gravity of purpose
and imminent prospect of execution [for], the statute [to be] properly be applied." 25 1 Unlike the Sixth Circuit, the Ninth Circuit does
not require evidence that the speaker communicated directly to the
target the speaker's specific intention of obtaining some immediate
benefit.2

52

According to the Ninth Circuit, the simple intention to say

the words alone is sufficient to satisfy whatever First Amendment protection exists for threatening speech-without regard to the speaker's
intention to carry out the threat, without regard to whether the threat
would ever be carried out, and apparently without regard to the

249 See supra notes 181-89 and accompanying text.
250 Planned Parenthood v. Am. Coalition of Life Activists, 290 F.3d 1058, 1074
(9th Cir. 2002) (en banc) (quoting United States v. Orozco-Santillan, 903 F.2d 1262,
1265 (9th Cir. 1990)).
251 United States v. Kelner, 534 F.2d 1020, 1027 (2d Cir. 1976).
252 United States v. Alkhabaz, 104 F.3d 1492, 1495 (6th Cir. 1997).
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253
speaker's expectation of any immediate benefit.

The Ninth Circuit's lenient standard for "true threats" looks remarkably like the equally lenient test applied to radical political advocacy in the era before Justice Holmes and Justice Brandeis began
refashioning First Amendment jurisprudence into the form we know
today. The test in the early free speech cases was "whether the natural
and probable tendency and effect of the words . . . are such as are
calculated to produce the result condemned by the statute." 254 Both

tendency and effect were issues of fact to be determined by juries.
Bound only by their own sense of verbal decorum and political risk
aversion, juries were generally hostile to most of the defendants who
came before them, with the unsurprising result that "[w]hatever the
offending language, surrounding circumstances, or jury instructions,
almost all prosecutions led to guilty verdicts.

' 255

Judges were not im-

mune to these punitive inclinations. Geoffrey Stone recently reviewed
the history of the Espionage Act of 1917, which was the statutory basis
for most of the early free speech prosecutions. 25 6 Stone notes that
most of the repressive results went beyond the scope of the legislature's intent and were the product of judges "operating in a feverish
atmosphere, not the most conducive to careful judicial reflection.
Too often, they gave in to the pressures of the time and to their own
fears and distaste for 'disloyalty.' "257 Before evolving into the great
First Amendment hero with his later opinions, Justice Holmes's early
and unprotective rendering of his clear and present danger analysis
merely rephrased the "tendency and effect" standard, and was applied
in such a way as to uphold the conviction of speakers without any concrete evidence that their speech had produced any negative effect
258
whatsoever.
Although it may judge the Ninth Circuit too harshly to say that
that circuit's standard for measuring "true threats" will result in similar repression as the early Espionage Act cases, the analogy between
the modern Ninth Circuit standard and the early political speech anal253 See Am. Coalition of Life Activists, 290 F.3d at 1075 ("It is not necessary that the
defendant intend to, or be able to carry out his threat; the only intent requirement
for a true threat is that the defendant intentionally or knowingly communicate the
threat.").
254 Shaffer v. United States, 255 F. 886, 888 (9th Cir. 1919).
255 DAVID M. RABBAN, FREE SPEECH IN ITS FORGOTTEN YEARs 257 (1997).
256 See Geoffrey R. Stone, Judge Learned Hand and the EspionageAct of 1917: A Mystery Unraveled, 70 U. CHI. L. REV. 335 (2003).
257 Id. at 357.
258 See Debs v. United States, 249 U.S. 211 (1919); Frohwerk v. United States, 249
U.S. 204 (1919); Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47 (1919).
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ysis is not unfair. The Ninth Circuit standard provides little or no
protection for speech phrased in the form of a threat, and does not
provide any clear and consistently applicable measure to enable an
appellate court to determine when a jury has gone too far. This narrower criticism is damning enough: the development of the modern
standard for protecting political speech under the First Amendment
was designed specifically to tie the hands of hostile factfinders, especially during periods in which juries and the public in general, in
Learned Hand's description, became "demoralized in all its sense of
proportion and toleration." 259 The only way to protect unpopular
speech during these periods is to apply a constitutional standard that
is, again in Learned Hand's phrase, "a qualitative formula, hard, conventional, difficult to evade." 2 60 The Ninth Circuit test fails to offer
any such protection. The tests used by other circuits are not as bad,
but all of the tests currently employed by the lower courts to assess the
existence of a "true threat" fall far short of the protections afforded
even the most incendiary political advocacy.
C.

"Intimidation"and the True Threat

All of which brings us back to Black and the issue of "intimidation." The question is this: by describing intimidation as a type of true
threat, did the Black majority intend to expand the concept of "true
threats" to cover generally threatening statements expressed in public
and directed at a general audience? Also, in its description of intimidation, did the Court implicitly embrace any of the lower court ap259 Gunther, supranote 181, at 761 (quoting Letter from Learned Hand to justice
Oliver Wendell Holmes (Nov. 25, 1919)).

260 Id. at 770 (quoting Letter from Learned Hand to Zechariah Chafee,Jr. (Jan. 2,
1921)). Robert Blakey and Brian Murray argue that achieving an "essentialist" definition of a "true threat" is "quixotic." G. Robert Blakey & Brian Murray, Threats, Free
Speech, and the Jurisprudence of the Federal Criminal Law, 2002 BYU L. REv. 829, 921

n.233. "What is needed, we believe, is an identification of the interests involved and a
careful balancing of them." Id. The question is who is to do this balancing and how
do the courts ensure that the First Amendment interests are entered into the balance
correctly? Ironically, Blakey and Murray quote Hand to support their fluid standard
for "true threats": "[There is] no escape in each situation from balancing the conflicting interests at stake with as detached a temper as we can achieve." Id. (quoting
LEARNED HAND, SPIRIT OF LIBERTY 179 (Irving Dillard ed., 3d ed. 1960)). As the quotation in the text accompanying this note indicates, Hand was far from sanguine about
juries achieving the preferred condition of a'"detached temper" in a case involving
antagonistic and unpopular speech, especially in times of social turmoil, and for that
reason he preferred to achieve the appropriate balance through strict definitions that
flexed as little as possible.
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proaches to the concept of the true threat? There are conflicting
indicators in Black regarding both issues.
According to the Black majority opinion, "' [t] rue threats' encompass those statements where the speaker means to communicate a serious expression of an intent to commit an act of unlawful violence to a
particular individual or group of individuals." 26 1 "Means to" indicates
that the Court is focusing on the speaker's intent. Like the Second
and Ninth Circuits, the Black majority indicates that the relevant intent is merely the intent to utter whatever words are found to be
threatening. "The speaker need not actually intend to carry out the
threat." 262 Thus, it is sufficient to satisfy the Constitution if the
speaker intended to say the thing that created fear in a listener. The
Court does not mention a Kelner-type explicitness requirement, nor
does it mention anything approximating an immediacy or clear and
present danger analysis. The Court then describes "intimidation": "Intimidation in the constitutionally proscribable sense of the word is a
type of true threat, where a speaker directs a threat to a person or
group of persons with the intent of placing the victim in fear of bodily
harm or death." 263

This simply repeats the description of "true

threats" quoted above, which appears in the same paragraph in the
Court's opinion.
This is as close as the Court gets to providing anything like a definition of either "true threats" or intimidation, and it generates more
questions than answers. For example, under the Court's theory, does
any statement indicating the possibility of future violence potentially
fall into the category of intimidation? Is there any requirement that
the threatened harm or violence be immediate? Is there any requirement that the threatened harm or violence be probable, or is the remote possibility of harm or violence sufficient? Does a speaker's
statement constitute constitutionally proscribable "intimidation" if it is
clear from the context in which the statement is made that the
speaker is neither likely to carry out the threat personally or direct
those who do carry out the threat? In other words, does simply creating an atmosphere in which dangers become more acute for the
speaker's opponent constitute "intimidation"? Does the speaker have
to obtain some personal benefit from the intimidating speech, or is a
generic political benefit (i.e., causing a political opponent to refrain
from some activity that does not personally benefit the speaker) sufficient to rob the speech of constitutional protection? Are public state261
262
263

538 U.S. 343, 359 (2003).
Id. at 359-60.
Id. at 360.
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ments containing veiled intimidation-e.g., "we know who you are"proscribable?
These questions matter because as the Court fits more generic
speech into the "intimidating speech" category, the category of unprotected "intimidating" speech begins to look like exactly the sort of political advocacy strongly protected under Brandenburg and Claiborne
Hardware. Consider the facts of Brandenburg: a member of the Ku
Klux Klan brandishes guns and ammunition, speaks at a rally attended
by other Klansmen in masks, claims "hundreds" of sympathetic members, talks about taking "revengeance" on his adversaries, singles out
African Americans and Jews in several statements with violent overtones, and announces an impending march to further the group's
hostile goals. 264 Why does this speech not fit the Black description of
proscribable intimidation? The speaker certainly intended to put fear
into the hearts of African Americans and Jews, specifically referred to
violence, brandished guns to underscore that violence, and hinted
that there were others in society that would carry out these goals. The
speaker's language was specific and his intent to intimidate was clear.
It was uncertain when the attack promised by the speaker would occur, but according to justice O'Connor in Black, "[t]he speaker need
not actually intend to carry out the threat."265 So why should it matter
that the facts in Brandenburgdid not indicate that the threatened violence was impending?
For that matter, given Justice O'Connor's broad description of
both threats and intimidation, it is not clear why the Court held that
Virginia could not constitutionally apply its cross burning statute to
the Klansman defendant who had burned a cross at a political rally.
Like the Klansman in Brandenburg,the Klansman defendant in Black
almost certainly had the requisite intent to intimidate the enemies of
the Klan (specifically, African Americans, Mexicans, and, according to
the record on appeal, Bill and Hillary Clinton).266 Although the Black
majority opinion implicitly (and correctly) characterizes the Klan
speech as political speech, 267 it is difficult to argue that the speaker
did not also have the "intent of placing the victim in fear of bodily
harm or death." 268 So why did the Black majority refuse to permit the
264 Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 445-46 & n.1 (1969) (per curiam).
265 Black, 538 U.S. at 359-60.
266 Id. at 349.
267 This is a necessary implication of the Black majority's decision to affirm the
lower court's reversal of the Klansman's conviction and not permit the state to resubmit his case to a jury for a new determination of intent. See id. at 367.
268 Id. at 360.
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state of Virginia to retry the Klansman under a properly limited interpretation of its cross burning statute?
It is possible to explain this anomaly, but only by interpreting the
concept of "true threats" more narrowly than the Court seems to intend in its general discussion of the concept in Black. The explanation would require the Court to adopt something like the framework
that has been suggested in connection with the Nuremberg Files
case. 2 69 The heart of this suggestion is that the Court's political advocacy standard should provide the framework for the Court's "true
threat" jurisprudence. Thus, a "true threat" should be gauged by a
version of the same three factors that are relevant to assessing the constitutional protection of radical political advocacy and speech urging
violations of law: i.e., explicitness, immediacy of harm, and the
speaker's intent to cause the harm to occur. The precise application
of these factors should depend on two characteristics of the speech
being challenged as a true threat: first, whether the threatening
speech was personalized, and second, whether the speech occurred in
public and was addressed to a general audience.
The limitation of the "true threats" concept to speech that is personalized is necessary to avoid denying constitutional protection to
speakers engaged in controversial political speech about controversial
topics. In disputes over the most contentious issues-war, abortion,
sexuality, the death penalty-speakers will often resort to the language of threats and intimidation to communicate the depth of the
speaker's feelings about the topic under discussion. The abortion dispute that spawned the Nuremberg Files is a case in point. Anti-abortion activists believe that individuals providing abortions are
murderers who are probably condemned to eternal damnation and
should be tried for their crimes by temporal courts. Abortion rights
activists believe that radical anti-abortion activists are engaged in massive human rights violations by intruding into the private lives of women seeking the procedure, and also believe that many anti-abortion
activists are capable of violence including murder to stop a medical
practice with which the opponents disagree. The feelings of each side
about the other are deep and visceral, and each side believes it must
communicate in the most direct fashion its willingness to do anything
to achieve ultimate victory. Resort to the language of threats and intimidation is inevitable in disputes such as this, and the First Amendment should (and in the political speech arena, already does) take
this into account. As Justice Harlan reminded us in Cohen v. California, the First Amendment free speech protection incorporates the rec269

See Gey, supra note 152.
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ognition that "words are often chosen as much for their emotive as
their cognitive force."2 70 Claiborne Hardware applies this recognition
to speech employing an explicitly threatening vocabulary.
The inevitability that speakers in emotional disputes will sooner
or later resort to threatening and intimidating speech does not mean
that all such speech operates on listeners the same way. The Court
has said that the concept of "true threats" governs when it is necessary
27
to protect individuals "from the disruption that fear engenders." '
But this fear cannot be the generalized fear of individuals locked in an
emotional dispute with their political opponents. This is true for two
reasons. First, listeners do not respond with the same kind of fear to
threats that do not single them out as targets of specific concern. Second, from a policing standpoint it is reasonable to assume that most
speakers expressing generalized threats have not progressed to the
point of actually carrying out threat. In contrast, it is reasonable to
assume the worst of a speaker who is willing not only to announce a
general threat, but also willing to name the target and describe the
27 2
Kelneris one example of
way in which the threat will be carried out.

such a case.
If the First Amendment is to remain meaningful in emotional debates, the only manifestation of fear that should be relevant to the
application of the "true threats" analysis is the personalized and immediate fear of a person who is singled out and told in no uncertain
terms that he or she is specifically targeted for attack. When threatening comments are made in public to a general audience and the
speaker does not mention a particular target of the threat, the fear
generated is too diffuse to justify government intervention to stop the
speech. In the time of Justice Holmes and Justice Brandeis, the general population feared (not without some justification) violent revolution, yet both Justice Holmes and Justice Brandeis rejected the
principle that generalized fear is a legitimate rationale for censoring
speech because there is no way of limiting the application of that principle. The reason is obvious: if a generalized, diffuse fear can be used
as a justification for sanctioning speech, then all aggressively antagonistic dissent will be subject to suppression. As Justice Douglas acerbically summed up the Court's repressive early application of the clear
and present danger test: "[T]he threats were often loud but always

270
271
272

403 U.S. 15, 26 (1971).
R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 388 (1992).
See, e.g., United States v. Kelner, 534 F.2d 1020 (2d Cir. 1976).
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puny and made serious only by judges so wedded to the status quo
that critical analysis made them nervous.

'2 73

If the Court is now willing to permit specific advocacy of violence
up to the point at which the violence is about to occur, then it seems
that generalized threats should also be permitted until the precision
of the speaker's language indicates that the threat has been focused in
a way that makes it reasonable to conclude that the speaker has gone
beyond discourse and is well on the way to action. This seems to be
the message of Claiborne Hardware. With regard to publicly uttered
threats, therefore, some version of the three Brandenburg factors
should be the focus of the "true threats" analysis. To be characterized
as a true threat, the threat first should be explicit in the sense that the
target of the threat is singled out and the speaker announces a specific intention to carry out the threat or help someone else carry out
the threat. Second, the danger inherent in the threat should be immediate. This does not mean that the action being threatened is immediate, but rather that the target of the threat will react immediately
in response to a threat that is specific, individualized, and proximate
enough to support a reasonable judgment that the threat might be
carried out. Thus, a "true threat" will require some relatively close
temporal and geographic proximity between the person uttering the
threat and the person being threatened. Third, the speaker should
possess the intent to carry out the threat, or at least the specific intent
to communicate a threat to a particular person in a manner that reasonably causes the target to alter his or her behavior or otherwise act
in a way that benefits the speaker.
Privately communicated threats raise somewhat different concerns than threats communicated publicly to a general audience. The
legal standard for identifying "true threats" should therefore be altered in a way that takes these concerns into consideration. There are
two reasons justifying this conclusion. First, it is reasonable to assume
that someone communicating a threat privately to the target of that
threat has the singular purpose of coercing the target without any
countervailing purpose of communicating ideas generally in the open
political marketplace. This presumption diminishes the ordinary First
Amendment concern with preserving the full emotive range of public
speech and protecting speakers who engage in political hyperbole or
rhetorical excess. The second reason to lower slightly the threshold
for denying First Amendment protection to privately communicated
threats is that such threats are far more likely to frighten the target of
the threat and therefore far more likely to cause the coerced change
273

Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 454 (1969) (Douglas, J., concurring).
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in behavior that is the objective of someone issuing a "true threat."
Threats communicated in public are more likely to generate support
and protection for the target-if only because others (including the
police) hear the threat at the same time-and do not have the inherently ominous overtones that a one-to-one communication conveys. A
privately communicated threat also will often involve an invasion of
personal space (a phone call to the home, for example) that increases
the target's sense of assault and denies the target any sense of per274
The very facts of
sonal refuge or margin of safety from antagonists.
invasion and personalization inherent in a privately communicated
threat will often be enough in themselves to transmit the intimidating

message.
Because the dynamics of the privately communicated threat are
likely to be more coercive, the First Amendment standard should be
altered to account for the different ways in which threatening gestures
operate in private versus public contexts. In both contexts proof of a
"true threat" should require proof of intent and immediacy (again, in
the sense that the seriousness of the threat and the physical and temporal proximity of the person communicating the threat are such that
a rational target of the threat would immediately respond by altering
his or her behavior to avoid the threatened action). These factors are
relevant in the same way to both public and private threats. On the
other hand, the explicitness requirement should be refined in private
274 The notion that everyone has a right to retreat into a personal refuge-especially their home-in which they may escape hostile speech has been used repeatedly
by the Court to justify protecting speech more extensively in the public arena.
We therefore categorically reject the argument that a vendor has a right
under the Constitution or otherwise to send unwanted material into the
home of another. If this prohibition operates to impede the flow of even
valid ideas, the answer is that no one has a right to press even "good" ideas
on an unwilling recipient. That we are often "captives" outside the sanctuary
of the home and subject to objectionable speech and other sound does not
mean we must be captives everywhere.
Rowan v. U.S. Post Office Dep't., 397 U.S. 728, 738 (1970); see also Frisby v. Schultz,
487 U.S. 474, 484-85 (1988) ("Although in many locations, we expect individuals
simply to avoid speech they do not want to hear.... the home is different.... Thus,
we have repeatedly held that individuals are not required to welcome unwanted
speech into their own homes and that the government may protect this freedom.");
Cohen, 403 U.S. at 21.
While this Court has recognized that government may properly act in many
situations to prohibit intrusion into the privacy of the home of unwelcome
views and ideas which cannot be totally banned from the public dialogue,....
we have at the same time consistently stressed that 'we are often "captives"
outside the sanctuary of the home and subject to objectionable speech.
Id. (quoting Rowan, 397 U.S. at 738) (citation omitted).
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threat cases to permit a finding of a "true threat" even in circumstances in which the speaker does not actually use explicitly threatening language. In some circumstances it should not be necessary to
prove that the speaker communicating a threat privately actually employed explicitly threatening terms. If the surrounding circumstances
are sufficiently menacing, the simple fact that the speaker sought out
and privately communicated with the target of the threat will often be
sufficient to justify construing the message as a "true threat." Context
is still crucial, and rigorous judicial oversight ofjuries will still be necessary to ensure that heated private disagreements are not automatically interpreted as threatening, but given the appropriately sinister
circumstances and background it may not be unreasonable to hold a
speaker liable for communicating a threat through indirection and
275
innuendo.
Even conceding the more lenient treatment of privately communicated threats, the framework suggested here provides substantially
more protection of threatening speech than all of the standards currently used by the lower courts. In defense of the proposed framework, this method of distinguishing "true threats" from protected
speech is true to the spirit of both Brandenburgand ClaiborneHardware.
The real question is whether the proposed framework is consistent
with the Court's most recent excursion into the "true threats" area in
Black. The analysis here is not intended to suggest that the Court has
formally adopted this framework for analyzing "true threats," and the
Black majority opinion is so imprecise that it is questionable whether
any broad principle-much less a definitive legal standard-can be
gleaned from the case. But it is at least clear from Black that the Court
specifically held that the First Amendment definitively protected the
275 Diluting the explicitness requirement should answer Robert Blakey and Brian
Murray's argument that the Brandenburg advocacy standard is inappropriate in the
threats context because "the interests [the two standards] protect are different." See
Blakey & Murray, supra note 260, at 1068 n.750. They argue that the explicitness
requirement of Brandenburg"is more concerned with preventing violence than with
preventing the bad results of the speech itself, that is, fear and disruption[, ...
whereas] threat statutes serve their most important purpose by focusing on fear and
disruption." Id. This is true, but an explicitness requirement is necessary in the context of publicly expressed threats because an audience's undifferentiated fear is not a
sufficient reason to suppress public speech to a general audience. Only particularized
and proximate fear and disruption are sufficient cause to suppress speech that is not
communicated privately. This is because it is reasonable to assume that the fear felt
by most members of an audience listening to a generalized and public threat will be
less intense than the recipient of a privately communicated threat, and also because
the restrictions imposed on robust public discussion in order to protect ultra-sensitive
listeners would be far too severe to satisfy the First Amendment.
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speech of one of the three defendants whose convictions were at issue
in the case, and we also know that in the course of reaching this conclusion the Court offered a list of factors to illustrate the difference
between protected political speech and an unprotected true threat/
intimidation. The ultimate holding of Black and the list of exemplary
factors are entirely consistent with the Brandenburg-derivedstandard
for "true threats" proposed here.
As for the Court's holding with regard to the three defendants
before the Court in Black, recall that two of the three defendants (who
were not affiliated with the Ku Klux Klan) had been arrested for276burnAling a cross in the yard of their African American neighbor.
though the Court upheld the reversal of their convictions because the
Virginia statute impermissibly permitted the jury to infer that they had
the requisite intent, the plurality remanded for possible reconsideration under a narrower interpretation of the statute that would require
defendants
juries to actually find beyond a reasonable doubt that the
277 The third
neighbor.
the
possessed the specific intent to intimidate
defendant, who was a leader of a local chapter of the Klan, had been
arrested after burning a cross at a Klan rally held in a field with the
permission of the property owner.2 78 With regard to this defendant,
the Court held simply that "his conviction cannot stand," and refused
because the First
to remand for reconsideration 2 79-presumably
Amendment prohibited any interpretation of the Virginia intimidation statute by which a speaker burning a cross under similar circumstances could be sent to jail.
The proposed "true threat" standard suggested above is consistent with both of the ultimate results in Black-i.e., that under some
interpretation of the relevant facts the first two defendants could be
convicted of expressing a true threat, but that the third defendant was
engaged in expressive conduct that was absolutely protected by the
First Amendment. The first two defendants were engaged in a privately communicated threat: the cross was burned in the front yard of
the target and clearly directed to his attention. Therefore, under the
standard proposed here, no proof of an explicit threat was necessary.
As for the second component of the standard, the threat was both
physically and temporally proximate, and therefore constituted an immediate threat. The presence of the third element of intent would
depend (as the Court held) on the introduction of specific evidence
276
277
278
279

Virginia v. Black, 538 U.S. 343, 350 (2003).
Id. at 367-68 (plurality opinion).
Id. at 348-49.
Id. at 367 (plurality opinion).
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at the retrial. Assuming that this evidence exists, the defendants
could be deemed to have had the necessary intent to scare the neighbor into refraining from objecting further about their backyard target
practice.28 0 Therefore, under the proposed standard the Court's ultimate decision as to the first two defendants is unobjectionable: they
could indeed be deemed to have engaged in a "true threat."
The third defendant, on the other hand, could not be said to
have satisfied any of the three elements of the proposed standard.
The expression occurred in public and was addressed to a general
audience. Therefore, the absence of explicitly threatening language
fails the first part of the proposed standard. Because there was no

immediately evident target, the second element also was not satisfied.
Because the speech fails the first two components of the standard, any
evidence of intent is irrelevant-which is precisely what the Court
seems to have held.
The exemplary factors cited by the Court to distinguish protected
speech from unprotected "true threats" reinforce the conclusion that
the proposed standard is consistent with the Court's general approach
to the concepts of intimidation and "true threats." In discussing the
problems presented by the prima facie intent component of the Virginia statute, the Court noted that the Virginia statute
does not distinguish between a cross burning done with the purpose
of creating anger or resentment and a cross burning done with the
purpose of threatening or intimidating a victim. It does not distinguish between a cross burning at a public rally or a cross burning on
a neighbor's lawn. It does not treat the cross burning directed at an
individual differently from the cross burning directed at a group of
like-minded believers. It allows ajury to treat a cross burning on the
property of another with the owner's acquiescence in the same
manner as a cross burning on the property of another without the
owner's permission. 28 1
These factors are similar to the concerns underlying the proposed standard. In particular, each of the factors mentioned by the
Court implies that the nature of a "true threat" is an individualized
verbal attack on a particular target, which must be expressed with the
proper intent-i.e., to coerce the target to engage in behavior
favorable to the speaker. Speech more general than that, or speech
that is addressed to a broader audience than the target alone, simply
does not fall into the narrow category of unprotected "true threats."

280 Id. at 350.
281 Id. at 366 (plurality opinion).
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This may be a Panglossian misreading of Justice O'Connor's
opinion in Black. As noted previously, the opinion is so vague that it is
possible to misread it in any number of ways. If this reading is wrong,
however, then the case portends bad things for future speakers who
transgress the normal rules of political decorum. A pessimistic reading of Black would lead to the equally pessimistic conclusion that the
decision has all the ingredients of a First Amendment disaster. The
first ingredient is the Court's continued embrace of the unprotected
category of speech called "true threats." The second ingredient is the
Supreme Court's reluctance to define that category precisely. The
third ingredient is a series of lower court opinions that fill in for the
Supreme Court by defining "true threats" in ways that focus only on
one or two salient factors (as in the Second and Sixth Circuits), or by
simply throwing the matter to an unguided jury. The fourth ingredient is the possibility that the government can broaden the category of
"true threats" by prosecuting any broadly phrased speech that is "intimidating," with the further possibility that "intimidating" speech may
not necessarily have to be focused in a precise way at a precise victim
or expressed in a context where the danger to the target is evident
and immediate. The fifth ingredient is the possibility that when the
Court defines unprotected intimidation as a threat directed against "a
282
it intends that definition to encompass
person or group of persons"

speech directed against a large, undifferentiated, and geographically
scattered group. If these ingredients are what the lower courts bring
away from Black, then the government has been given a powerful new
tool to use against individuals and groups that engage in angry political discourse.
This is unwelcome news because federal and state governments
recently have enacted legislation giving officials the authority to regulate a broadly construed category of speech that is deemed "intimidating." For example, the state of Virginia enacted a statute in 2002
permitting the enhancement of crimes that also constitute "acts of terrorism." Such acts are defined as acts of violence "committed with the
intent to (i) intimidate the civilian population at large; or (ii) influence the conduct or activities of the government of the United States,
'28 3 Federal law contains a sima state or locality through intimidation.
ilar provision defining "terrorism" to include acts intended "to influ4
or coercion." 28
ence the policy of a government by intimidation
282 Id. at 360.
283 VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-46.4 (Lexis 2004); see supra note 4.
284 18 U.S.C. § 2331 (1)-(B) (ii) (2000) (defining international terrorism); id.
§ 2331(5) (B) (ii) (Supp. II 2002) (defining domestic terrorism).
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Among other things, the federal definition of terrorism can be used as
the basis of a civil suit by private individuals against organizations engaged in such acts. 28 5 At first glance this seems unexceptionable, until

one ponders how such a statute would apply to anti-globalization
protesters, 28 6 radical

Islamic

groups, 2 8 7 anti-abortion

protesters,

Greenpeace,288 or other groups that commit minor acts of violence or
civil disobedience with the intention to "influence the conduct or activities of the government of the United States, a state or locality
through intimidation." The expansion of the concept of "intimidation" beyond the narrow range of one-on-one "true threats" threatens
to restrict radical political advocacy by providing an alternative route
to the highly protective Brandenburgmodel of First Amendment protection. This is the concern raised by the pessimistic reading of Black.
This concern is heightened by the fact that this is only one of several
Brandenburg alternatives the Court has approved recently. The next
Part will address the collective effect of these alternatives on the constitutional protection of core political speech.

285 See id. § 2333(a) (permitting "[a]ny national of the United States injured in his
or her person, property, or business by reason of an act of international terrorism"
to
sue in federal court and collect triple damages and attorneys' fees); see Boim
v.
Quranic Literacy Inst., 291 F.3d 1000 (7th Cir. 2002) (holding that 18 U.S.C. §
2333
does not apply to "funding, simpliciter," but may be applied to individuals contributing to terrorist organizations if the contributor "knew about the organization's illegal
activity, desired to help that activity succeed and engaged in some act of helping").
286 Since violent confrontations between anti-globalization protesters and police
at
protests during free trade talks in Seattle in 1999, free trade meetings around
the

world have been the focal point of protests that usually result in scattered acts of
violence and thousands of arrests. See Austin Bunn, Them Against the World, N.Y.
TIMES, Nov. 16, 2003, § 6 (Magazine), at 58. Recent free trade meetings in Miami led
to multiple arrests and allegations of serious and extensive police overreaction against
protesters. See Abby Goodnough, Group Wants Investigation of Police Tactics at Miami
Trade Talks, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 27, 2003, at A24.
287 See Boim, 291 F.3d 1000.
288 The federal government recently indicted the organization Greenpeace under
an obscure 1872 federal statute, see 18 U.S.C. § 2279, after several Greenpeace members boarded a ship to unfurl a banner protesting the illegal shipment of mahogany.
See Adam Liptak, Typical Greenpeace Protest Leads to an Unusual Prosecution, N.Y. TIMES,
Oct. 11, 2003, at A9. Although the individual Greenpeace members had already
served time in jail for the unauthorized boarding of the ship, the United States Attorney's office indicted the group itself, arguing that "[t]he heart of Greenpeace's mission is the violation of the law." Id.
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NOT POLITICAL SPEECH, THEN WHAT Is LEFT OF
BRANDENBURG V. OHIO?

In its opinion upholding the $120 million judgment in the Nuremberg Files case, the Ninth Circuit refused to apply the Brandenburg
political speech standard, and therefore went to great lengths to distinguish the Nuremberg Files facts from the equally threatening
speeches deemed constitutionally protected in Claiborne Hardware.
The court of appeals first noted that unlike its case, ClaiborneHardware
did not arise under a threats statute, and then systematically diminished the seriousness of the speech at issue in the Mississippi case:
To the extent there was any intimidating overtone, Evers's rhetoric
was extemporaneous, surrounded by statements supporting non-violent action, and primarily of the social ostracism sort. No specific
individuals were targeted. For all that appears, "the break your
neck" comments were hyperbolic vernacular. Certainly there was
no history that Evers or anyone else associated with the NAACP had

broken anyone's neck who did not participate in, or opposed, this
boycott or any others. Nor is there any indication that Evers's listeners took his statement that boycott breakers' "necks would be bronecks would be broken; they kept
ken" as a serious threat that their28
9

on shopping at boycotted stores.
All these claims are literally true, but they also would seriously
mislead anyone who is not familiar with the factual context of Claiborne Hardware. Evers's speech had a clearly and intentionally intimidating tone, the "break your neck" comment was made in a context
where necks had been broken and so-called "black hats" or "deacons"
were regularly posted outside of stores to "identif[y] those who traded
with merchants," 2 90 and no one living in the town with any common
sense would fail to understand that if they intended to shop with the
banned merchants, then Evers's speech was directed specifically at
them. If anything, the intimidation stemming from the speech in
ClaiborneHardwarewas much more direct and immediate than the intimidation flowing from the speech in the Nuremberg Files case. The
speech in ClaiborneHardwareoccurred in a small town, the conflict was
ongoing, and the threatening speakers and their potential victims
lived virtually next door to each other. The posters and website at
289 Planned Parenthood v. Am. Coalition of Life Activists, 290 F.3d 1058, 1073-74
(9th Cir. 2002) (en banc), cert. denied, 539 U.S. 958 (2003).
290 NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware Co., 458 U.S. 886, 903 (1982). In stating that
.necks had been broken," I am referring to the several violent acts that were committed: guns were fired at several houses, bricks were thrown at a car windshield, a beating occurred, and an old man was physically harassed. Id. at 904-05.
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issue in the Nuremberg Files case, on the other hand, were handed
out in various locales, the defendant speakers and their targets were
geographically dispersed, and although the dispute between abortion
opponents and proponents is ongoing and often intemperate, the nationwide nature of the dispute robs it of the claustrophobic atmosphere and the compressed intensity of the small-town boycott in
Claiborne Hardware. None of this is intended to suggest that the
threats in the Nuremberg Files case were any less frightening to the
individuals named on the posters and website than the threats against
those who did not comply with the boycott in ClaiborneHardware. This
is merely to suggest that an objective assessment of the respective expressive acts in the two cases could plausibly lead to the conclusion
that the speakers in ClaiborneHardwarewere more directly linked to a
likelihood of immediate violence than the speakers in the Nuremberg
Files case.
The important point, however, is not that the Ninth Circuit could
distinguish the facts in Claiborne Hardware from those in the Nuremberg Files case; the important point is that the consequences of distinguishing ClaiborneHardwarewere to allow the Ninth Circuit to apply a
different legal standard altogether. As a practical matter, a decision
governed by the political speech doctrine set forth in Brandenburgand
291
elaborated in cases such as ClaiborneHardwareand Hess v. Indiana
is
unlikely to uphold sanctions against speech in the absence of some
concrete injury instigated immediately by the speech. If the Court's
political speech decisions do not provide absolute protection of
speech, they come very close. So upholding sanctions against speech
requires an alternative to the Brandenburgstandard.
A.

The Proliferation of Alternatives to Brandenburg

The tendency to distinguish the Supreme Court's important political speech cases in order to apply a different-and markedly less
rigorous-First Amendment standard is increasingly common. The
Supreme Court and lower courts have invented a number of alternative speech-regulation constructs that provide a way around the nearly
absolute protections offered by Brandenburgand its ilk. These alternative speech constructs greatly lessen-and sometimes eliminate altogether-First Amendment protection for speech that is often
indistinguishable from speech that is incontrovertibly protected
under Brandenburg. There are two troubling aspects of this trend.
291 414 U.S. 105, 107 (1973) (overturning on First Amendment grounds the disorderly conduct conviction of a student who faced a crowd of antiwar demonstrators
and shouted: "We'll take the fucking street again [or later]").
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The first is that the courts display very little recognition that they are
gradually shrinking the territory covered by the crown jewel of the
First Amendment- Brandenburg and the other political speech cases
that embody the legacy of the classic Holmes and Brandeis free
speech opinions. Second, the courts have fragmented the First
Amendment landscape without making any effort to coordinate the
fragments by reference to an overarching principle of free speech protection. We have been told by various courts why threats are troublesome, but we have not been told why the First Amendment standard
these courts apply to threats is several orders of magnitude less protective than the standard for political speech. After all, if threats are worrisome, then so is incitement to political violence or revolution.
There is no grand principle to explain the development of the
"true threat" alternative to Brandenburg. As discussed in the preceding
section, the cases dealing with "true threats" (and now with the intimidation variant of "true threats") simply take the model of personal
coercion and one-on-one duress and apply that model to contexts
(such as the one surrounding the Nuremberg Files posters and website) involving much more generalized speech. In these cases, the fear
felt by the target of the threat seems indistinguishable from the fear
felt by the targets of the speech protected by the Court in Brandenburg
or Claiborne Hardware. The courts have provided no comprehensive
explanation for why such slight differences in the threatening contexts justify the application of such different levels of First Amend292
ment protection.
292 The growing tendency to provide significantly lower levels of constitutional
protection to different categories of speech involving very similar levels of risk undercuts the usual theoretical arguments supporting the categorization of speech within
the First Amendment generally. The most compelling argument for providing different levels of First Amendment protection to different categories of speech is that the
courts would otherwise reduce the protection offered "core" political speech or would
simply exclude altogether certain types of speech from the First Amendment. In
Frederick Schauer's classic rendition of this argument:

[I]f we take the "full protection within" [the First Amendment] rule as the
standard, there may be pressure to keep troublesome categories completely
outside [the First Amendment]. When the choice is all or nothing, the difficulties of "all" may lead courts to choose "nothing." . . . If the creation of a
separate category within the First Amendment is precluded, a tempting solution is merely to keep the speech that would constitute that category outside
first amendment protection.
Frederick Schauer, Categories and the First Amendment: A Play in Three Acts, 34 VAND. L.
REv. 300, 286 (1981).
There are two problems with this argument, both of which are illustrated by the
description in the text accompanying this note regarding the proliferation of Brandenburg alternatives. First, the division of the First Amendment into higher and lower-
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Aside from the "true threats" cases, another Brandenburgalternative involves the use of speech to enhance the penalty of ordinary
crimes. One year after the Court decided unanimously in R.A.V. v.
City of St. Paul2 93 that the St. Paul, Minnesota, hate speech ordinance
violated the First Amendment, the Court unanimously upheld the
Wisconsin hate speech enhancement statute in Wisconsin v. Mitchell.2 94
A full critique of this case can be found elsewhere; 295 the crucial aspect of the case for present purposes is that the Supreme Court approved the concept that the First Amendment imposes no limitation
on penalties applied to speech if the speech occurs in conjunction
with illegal conduct. 29 6 As with the cases applying the "true threats"
value categories of speech does nothing to bolster the protection offered the highervalue categories of speech if the criteria defining the categories are so fluid that
speech can easily be shifted from one category to another. Second, if the level of
protection offered to disfavored speech within the First Amendment is so weak that it
simply grants juries the kind of power to sanction unpopular speech that they exercised under the Schenck/Frohwerk/Debs version of the clear and present danger standard, then the practical result of categorizing speech within the First Amendment will
be indistinguishable from the practical result of excluding that disfavored speech
from the First Amendment altogether.
293 505 U.S. 377 (1992).
294 508 U.S. 476 (1993).
295 See Steven G. Gey, What If Wisconsin v. Mitchell Had Involved Martin Luther
King, Jr.? The ConstitutionalFlaws of Hate Crime Enhancement Statutes, 65 GEo. WASH. L.
REV. 1014 (1997).
296 The statute used in Mitchell permitted the enhancement of criminal penalties
when the person committing the crime "select[ed] the person against whom the
crime .. . [was] committed .. .because of the race, religion, color, disability, sexual

orientation, national origin or ancestry of that person." Wis. STAT. § 939.645(1) (b)
(1989-1990). In Mitchell itself, the statute was used to enhance the aggravated assault
charge against a young African American man who joined several friends in assaulting
a white man. The basic facts are that Mitchell and his friends were discussing the
movie Mississippi Burning at a Kenosha, Wisconsin, apartment complex. Mitchell, 508
U.S. at 479-80. At some point, Mitchell said to the group: "Do you all feel hyped up
to move on some white people?" Id. at 480. A few moments later, the white victim
passed by Mitchell and his friends on the opposite side of the street. Mitchell said to
the group: "You all want to fuck somebody up? There goes a white boy; go get him."
Id. The group then attacked the victim, putting him in a coma for four days. Id.
Mitchell was convicted of aggravated battery, which carried a maximum sentence of
two years. Id. Under the Wisconsin enhancement statute, however, he could be sentenced to another seven years in prison because he had selected his victim on the
basis of race. Id. Mitchell's jury found that his crime was racially motivated and sentenced him to four years in prison. Id. at 480-81.
There is no question that Mitchell could be sentenced to two years for aggravated
battery. The question is whether the First Amendment permitted the state to sentence him to an extra two years merely because he uttered racist words before the
crime. If Mitchell had not actually participated in the crime, then the question would
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alternative to Brandenburg, the Court's short opinion in Mitchell provides no deep theoretical justification for its rather perfunctory conclusion approving the use of speech to justify the enhancement of
criminal penalties. The implications of this approach are, however,
quite extensive. This approach gives the government (and a political
speaker's opponents) the ability to circumvent the First Amendment's
protection of political speech simply by using a speaker's illegal action
to justify penalizing the speech. The illegal action could range from
serious crimes (such as in Mitchell) to low-level infractions (such as
trespassing and parade permit ordinance violations, which commonly
accompany political demonstrations) to any tortious act enforceable
by civil sanctions. In all these circumstances, the same rule evidently
applies: the Constitution allows the government to take the violator's
expression into consideration in allocating sanctions and allows use of
the violator's stated ideological objectives to justify punishing his or
her conduct "more severely than the same conduct engaged in for
29 7
some other reason or for no reason at all."

The possibility that this principle will be used to sanction political
protesters is not hypothetical. In one Oregon case, the Oregon courts
cited Mitchell in upholding a punitive damages judgment assessed
298
against the environmental group Earth First.

Members of the

group had chained themselves to logging equipment, hung banners,
and sang songs as acts of civil disobedience to protest logging activities
in a national forest.29 9 The protesters were arrested, charged, and
convicted of criminal mischief in the third degree, for which they
served two weeks in jail and paid $250.300 They were then sued by the
be whether he had incited his friends to commit the crime. Even under the stringent
requirements of Brandenburg, the answer to this question would probably be "yes";
Mitchell made explicit statements urging the violence, the time frame in which the
violence occurred was immediate, and he clearly indicated that he intended the violence to occur-thereby satisfying all three elements of the Brandenburganalysis. But
the ultimate result under this analysis would be that Mitchell would be deemed to
have aided and abetted the actual participants in the beating. From this perspective,
incitement to a crime is a lesser-included offense of the actual crime. Therefore, one
could not be convicted of both incitement and the crime. In the actual Mitchell facts,
however, Mitchell had participated in the beating; thus, his incitement was merely

one aspect of the crime of aggravated battery itself, for which he was sentenced to the
maximum of two years. The extra two years of his sentence were for the words he
expressed and the thoughts behind them. He was sentenced to two years for what he
did and another two years for announcing why he did it.
297 Id. at 485.
298 Huffman & Wright Logging Co. v. Wade, 857 P.2d 101 (Ore. 1993).
299 Id. at 105.
300 Id.
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logging company for lost revenues; a jury awarded the company
$5717.34 and punitive damages of $25,000.s ° I The Oregon Supreme
Court rejected the protesters' First Amendment claim that they were
being penalized because of their constitutionally protected beliefs.
The court cited Mitchell for the proposition that the jury could take
the protesters' motivations into consideration in determining punitive
damages because "defendants' conduct, although accompanied by expressive activity, produced a special cognizable harm (an interference
with plaintiff's possessory interest in its property), distinct from any
communicative impact." 30 2 The effect of this approach may well be
"the beginning of the end of civil disobedience in Oregon." 30 3 Any
criminal or tortious activity occurring during an otherwise constitutionally protected protest may lead to ruinous damage assessments
against protest groups and their members.
Another example of how courts have used Mitchell to circumvent
First Amendment protections arises in challenges to the military rules
excluding homosexuals. Courts frequently cite Mitchell to rebut First
Amendment challenges to the military's "don't ask, don't tell" policy,
which excludes admitted homosexuals who make their proclivities
public. In many "don't ask, don't tell" cases verbal admissions of homosexuality (which would otherwise be regarded as constitutionally
protected speech) are used to prove the forbidden homosexual actions. To many courts, Mitchell provides the route around the First
Amendment: "Just as ajury might infer a criminal violation from statements of the accused, the Navy infers prohibited homosexual acts
from admissions of homosexuality. This inference follows the common sense notion that those who identify themselves as homosexual
have engaged and will engage in homosexual acts."3 0 4 The point is
that Mitchell provides a handy alternative to circumventing the politi301 Id. at 106.
302 Id. at 112.
303 See Thomas A. Ped, Note, Huffman & Wright Logging Co. v. Wade: The Beginning of the End of Civil Disobedience in Oregon, 30 WILLAMETrE L. REV. 747 (1994). For
other critical commentary on the use of Mitchell-type enhanced sanctions against
demonstrators engaged in civil disobedience, see Leslie Gielow Jacobs, Applying Penalty Enhancements to Civil Disobedience: Clarifying the Free Speech Model to Bring the Social
Value of PoliticalProtest into Balance, 59 OHIO ST. L.J. 185 (1998); Kaarin L. Axelsen,
Note, Problems of Punitive Damagesfor PoliticalProtest and Civil Disobedience,25 ENrL. L.
495 (1995).
304 Selland v. Perry, 905 F. Supp. 260, 263-64 (D. Md. 1995). For other "don't ask,
don't tell" cases using this tactic, see Richenberg v. Perry, 97 F.3d 256, 263 (8th Cir.
1996); Thomasson v. Perry, 80 F.3d 915, 931 (4th Cir. 1996), affg 895 F. Supp. 820,
824 (E.D. Va. 1995) (both the district court and court of appeals opinions relying on
Mitchell); Hrynda v. United States, 933 F. Supp. 1047, 1053 (M.D. Fla. 1996); Watson
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cal speech protections of Brandenburg if governments or political opponents want to sanction speech they do not like, they can get around
the strong protections of Brandenburg by linking the speech to some
illegal act, in which case the First Amendment protections fall away
and the speech becomes fair game for legal sanctions.
A third Brandenburgalternative involves what Justice Stevens has
called "speech that serves a teaching function." 30 5 Such cases involve
speech that goes beyond advocacy to actually teach the mechanics of
dangerous or illegal activity. The Supreme Court has not yet reviewed
a case of this sort, but in Rice v. PaladinEnterprises, Inc., 30 6 the Fourth

Circuit Court of Appeals issued a prominent and widely cited decision
articulating a very narrow range of constitutional protection for
"teaching" cases. The Fourth Circuit decision involved a short instructional book entitled Hit Man.30 7 As the book's title implies, the book

purports to be a how-to manual for assassins. It provides information
on topics ranging from the proper dress for an assassination, to the
best methods of killing, to how to dispose of the body after the "hit"
has been accomplished. The case was a wrongful death civil action
brought against the publisher of the book by the family of a woman
killed by a contract killer hired by the victim's ex-husband. 30 8 The
killer had a copy of Hit Man in his apartment at the time he committed the murder.3 0 9 The district court granted the publisher's summary judgment motion on First Amendment grounds.
The legal merits of the court of appeals opinion in Rice are muddled by the decision of the publisher to stipulate to all three components of Brandenburg.310 The publisher even stipulated that by selling
the book he "intended to attract and assist criminals and would-be
criminals who desire information and instructions on how to commit
crimes," and that he assisted "in particular in the perpetration of the
very murders for which the victims' families now attempt to hold [the
publisher] civilly liable." 31 1 For whatever reason-perhaps a taste for
martyrdom or a desire to press the courts to grant protection even
beyond the outer reaches of Brandenburg-thepublisher's stipulations
v. Perry, 918 F. Supp. 1403, 1418 (W.D. Wash. 1996); Philips v. Perry, 883 F. Supp.
539, 547 (W.D. Wash. 1995), affd, 106 F.3d 1420 (9th Cir. 1997).
305 Stewart v. McCoy, 537 U.S. 993, 995 (2002) (StevensJ., opinion respecting the
denial of petition for writ of certiorari).

307

128 F.3d 233 (4th Cir. 1997).
REx FERAL, HIT MAN (1983).

308
309
310
311

Rice, 128 F.3d at 239.
Id.
Id. at 241.
Id.

306
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provided the court of appeals with a simple means to reverse the district court's grant of summary judgment in favor of the publisher.
Since the publisher essentially admitted that the plaintiffs had satisfied the Brandenburg test, it should have been easy for the court of
appeals to reverse the district court once the appellate court decided
to decline the publisher's invitation to go beyond Brandenburg.
The Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals saw things differently, however. Instead of accepting the publisher's ill-advised invitation to write
a perfunctory reversal of the district court's summary judgment decision based on Brandenburg,the Fourth Circuit embarked on a meandering discussion-all of it unnecessary dicta-of why Brandenburgdid
not apply to this case at all. This is the portion of the Rice decision
that provides the template for an alternative to Brandenburgin cases
involving speech that teaches, rather than advocates illegal action.
The basic theory is that such "teaching" speech amounts to aiding and
abetting the crime: "[T]he First Amendment does not necessarily
pose a bar to liability for aiding and abetting a crime, even when such
aiding and abetting takes the form of the spoken or written word." 312
There was no allegation in Rice that the publisher knew the contract
killer of the plaintiff's family member, or that prior to being sued the
publisher even knew that the killing had taken place. Thus, applying
the concept of aiding and abetting to this case involves a far more
attenuated interpretation of the concept than is common in either
criminal or civil cases. Although there are only scattered decisions in
Virginia recognizing the tort of aiding and abetting, the standard that
has been applied in such cases requires a much more direct connection to the underlying act than is present in Rice. One Virginia decision describes the relevant standard as requiring "substantial
assistance by the aider and abetter in the achievement of the [underlying tort]."313 However the description of the concept is phrased, the
concept of aiding and abetting loses all meaning unless it requires
active participation in the actual underlying tort. It is difficult to conceive of a person aiding and abetting a tort that he does not even
know is occurring.
The Fourth Circuit's position is that the simple provision of information constitutes the relevant "aid," but the court amends this proposition by adding that the information can only be the subject of
legal liability if it is coupled with the speaker's "purpose of assisting in
312 Id. at 244.
313 Sherry Wilson and Co., Inc. v. Generals Court, L.C., No. 21696, 2002 WL
32136374 (Va. Cir. Ct. Sept. 27, 2002).
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the commission of crime."3 14 But note the absence of a definite article in this quotation; the relevant intent is not the intent to assist the
commission of a particular crime, but rather the intent of assisting
with the commission of crime in general. The force of the Fourth
Circuit's opinion stems from its insistence that the contents of Hit
Man are dangerous and will lead inevitably to murder and mayhem.
But in the end, the court does not permit courts to assign liability
based on the information alone. The information is apparently not
the real problem. 31 5 The court insists that a newspaper could publish
exactly the same information without fear of liability because "neither
the intent of the reporter nor the purpose of the report is to facilitate
repetition of the crime.

' 31 6

The real problem, therefore, is the court's

moral revulsion at the defendant's motive for publishing this information. According to the court, the intent requirement "would not relieve from liability those who would, for profit or other motive,
intentionally assist and encourage crime and then shamelessly seek
refuge in the sanctuary of the First Amendment."3 17 The court is not
concerned with dangerous information; it is concerned with the publisher's civic immorality.
To the extent that this civic immorality poses any threat to the
community, it is a threat that looks very much like the sort of incitement discussed by the Supreme Court in its political advocacy cases.
The Fourth Circuit worries that "through powerful prose in the second person and imperative voice, [the book] encourages its readers in
their specific acts of murder."3 1 8 But if the problem with the book is
that it "encourages... specific acts of murder," then the author of the
book is engaged in incitement and the book is therefore subject to the
Brandenburg immediacy analysis. The book still may seem problematic
until one reflects on the three instances of speech that the modern
Supreme Court has already deemed protected under Brandenburg: (1)
Klansmen flaunting guns and talking about "revengeance,"3 1 9 (2) angry civil rights advocates discussing "breaking necks" in a heated context where violence has already occurred, 320 and (3) during a large
314 Rice, 128 F.3d at 248.
315 Indeed, although the premise of the court's ultimate conclusion is that the raw
information in the book is dangerous if not incendiary, several pages of the book's
contents are reprinted in the Fourth Circuit's opinion, see id. at 235-41, and are available for downloading on the Fourth Circuit website.

316
317
318

Id. at 266.
Id. at 248.
Id. at 252.

319
320

Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 446 (1968).
NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware Co., 458 U.S. 886, 900 n.28 (1981).
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demonstration in which students have just been moved off the street
by the police, the defendant agitating the crowd by shouting either
"we'll take the fucking street again" or "we'll take the fucking
street
later."3 21 All three of these examples involve speakers who directly
encourage an audience to commit acts of violence or illegal behavior,
and two of them involve speech occurring in agitated situations in
which violence could occur at any moment. If the immediacy requirement applies, it is hard to understand why these three instances of
speech are protected but a book's "powerful" and "imperative" prose
is not. The potential harm in the typical Brandenburgcontext is much
more direct and immediate than the harm posed by the publication of
a single book, no matter how "powerful" that book's prose may be.
This absence of immediacy is, of course, why the Fourth Circuit had to
devise a way around Brandenburg. Hence the different standard for
"teaching" speech. 322
321 Hess v. Indiana, 414 U.S. 105, 107 (1973).
322 The absence of an immediate threat in Rice makes the court's strong rhetoric
seem like something of an overreaction. This impression is bolstered by a review of
the information contained in the book Hit Man. Most of the book's contents provides the most obvious and superficial kind of instructional material. For example,
the book suggests wearing dark clothes if the crime is to be committed at night, driving a rental car instead of one that can be traced to the owner, staying in a hotel near
the crime scene, and wearing gloves during the crime to avoid leaving fingerprints.
See Rice 128 F.3d at 236, 240. The book's suggestions for disposing of a body are
equally obvious, if a bit more gruesome. The book suggests, for example, that the "hit
man" tie a concrete block to the body if depositing the body in a lake or river to
prevent the body from floating to the surface when gasses form during decomposition. Id. at 238. The book also provides suggestions for disposing of a body on dry
land: "Take the head to some deserted location, place a stick of dynamite in the
mouth, and blow the telltale dentition to smithereens!" Id. Leaving aside the author's colorful descriptions, is any of this information going to come as news to even
slow-witted criminals? Is it revealing a closely held secret of professional hit men that
a stick of dynamite will eliminate most physical evidence?
The book Hit Man has a certain grand guignol quality that becomes more understandable once the volume's origins are understood. The book's author is listed as
"Rex Feral." This name (Latin for "King of Beasts") is, of course, a pseudonym. Although the book's cover touts the author as a professional hit man, we now know that
the real author was an unemployed mother of two who wrote the book to earn money
to pay her property taxes. See David Montgomery, If Books Could Kill: This Publisher
Offers Lessons in Murder. Now He's a Target Himself, WAsH. PosT, July 26, 1998, at Fl.
She originally submitted the book as a novel, but the publisher told her to rewrite it as
a how-to book. According to a letter she sent to the publisher, she got her lethal ideas
"from books, television, newspapers, police officers, my karate instructor, and a good
friend who is an attorney." Id. Although the publisher's catalog described her as a
"lethal weapon aimed at those he [sic] hunts," in fact the author did not even own a
gun. Id. "But," she urged in the letter to the publisher, "don't tell anybody." Id.
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Rice is by no means the only application of this Brandenburgalternative. For many years courts have been using this theory to punish
individuals who give seminars and publish books and pamphlets urging people to refuse to pay taxes and offering suggestions for illegally
avoiding the payment of taxes. The courts' routine explanation is that
Brandenburgdoes not protect the speakers in these cases because the
speech "explained how to avoid withholding... [and] incited several
individuals to activity that violated federal law and had the potential of
substantially hindering the administration of revenue.

'3 23

In these

cases the notion that the defendants "incited" the illegal conduct is
used in only the loosest sense. The defendants offered various other
individuals information, and those other individuals took that information and-after due consideration and under their own free willviolated the law. 32 4 This is far removed from the "fire in a crowded

theater" concept of incitement-i.e., speech that causes a visceral, immediate, and unthinking reaction-that is the mainstay of the Brandenburg political speech standard. Several different circuits have
treated speech that simply provides information on how to avoid taxes
as evidence of aiding and abetting the ultimate tax fraud of the delin3 25
The Fourth Circuit
quent taxpayers who act on that information.
a conviction
uphold
to
theory
abetting
itself employed the aiding and
326
Some of these
of this sort over a decade before it decided Rice.

323 United States v. Buttorff, 572 F.2d 619, 624 (8th Cir. 1978). The defendants'
offense was giving a series of seminars to employees of theJohn Deere Tractor factory
in Dubuque, Iowa. Id. at 622. According to the court,

[m]ost of the testimony recalled speeches given by the defendants, the major portion of which dealt with the Constitution, the Bible, and the unconstitutionality of the graduated income tax. The evidence indicates that the
discussions of the W-4 and W-4E forms occurred primarily during question
and answer sessions following the speeches.
Id. With one exception, no individual taxpayer "testified that either defendant actually assisted him in preparing a W-4 or W-4E, or was with him when he filed such a
form. Most testified to having other sources of information on tax evasion and other
influences on his activity in the tax protest movement." Id. at 623. Thus, the only
basis for the aiding and abetting charge was the defendants' public speech to a general audience.
324 Cases involving actual assistance in the preparation and filing of false tax forms
are obviously different than the pure speech cases, and the direct assistance of illegal
conduct takes these cases out of the First Amendment context. See, e.g., United States
v. Fletcher, 322 F.3d 508 (8th Cir. 2003) (defendants are convicted for aiding and
abetting tax fraud based on evidence that they held seminars and actually met with
and prepared tax returns for individual clients).
325 See Buttorff 572 F.2d 619; United States v. Rowlee, 899 F.2d 1275 (2d Cir.
1990); United States v. Freeman, 761 F.2d 549 (9th Cir. 1985).
326 See United States v. Kelly, 769 F.2d 215 (4th Cir. 1985).
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cases even approve injunctions ordering tax protesters to cease distributing books and other materials and also cease speaking at seminars at
which they "incite" the audience to avoid taxes illegally. 3 27 Thus, the

aiding and abetting theory has been used to circumvent not only
Brandenburg,but also the traditional First Amendment prohibition on
prior restraints.
These are merely two of the contexts in which lower courts have
reviewed speech that teaches, rather than simply advocates illegal conduct under a First Amendment standard that falls far short of the
Brandenburg incitement/immediate harm standard. The Supreme
Court has thus far avoided reviewing any of these decisions. At least
one Supreme Court Justice, however, has suggested that he might be
sympathetic to a "teaching speech" alternative to Brandenburg. In McCoy v. Stewart,328 the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the issuance of a writ of habeas corpus on behalf of a former gang member
from California who attended a barbecue with members of an Arizona
gang during which he offered his opinion about some of the Arizona
gang's activities. 329 Based on these comments, the Arizona courts convicted the former gang member for participating in a criminal street
gang.33 ° The Ninth Circuit upheld a district court decision to issue a
writ of habeas corpus on the ground that the former gang member's
3 31
informal advice to the Arizona gang was protected by Brandenburg.
The Supreme Court denied certiorari, but Justice Stevens filed a separate opinion in which he noted that the imminence component of
Brandenburg "does not necessarily adhere to some speech that performs a teaching function."3 3 2 Although he does not definitively state
that he would deny constitutional protection to such speech, Justice
Stevens asserts that "oral advice, training exercises, and perhaps the
preparation of written materials" should not "glibly" be characterized
as advocacy and therefore afforded the strong protections of
Brandenburg3.3 3
Assuming that the context is not one in which the speaker is actively participating in a criminal enterprise, it is unclear why Brandenburg should not apply to speech that simply offers advice or gives
327 See, e.g., United States v. Kaun, 827 F.2d 1144 (7th Cir. 1987); United States v.
Schiff, 269 F. Supp. 2d 1262 (D. Nev. 2003).
328 282 F.3d 626 (9th Cir. 2002).
329 Id. at 628.
330 Id.
331 Id. at 631.
332 Stewart v. McCoy, 537 U.S. 993, 995 (2002) (Stevens, J., opinion respecting the
denial of petition for writ of certiorari).
333 Id.
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instructions that may inform the possible behavior of others. The
main thrust of the Court's political advocacy standard is that the responsibility for criminal conduct is on the person who engages in the
conduct, not the person who encourages or advocates that conduct.
In the advocacy context, the government may not censor speech simply because some people who hear that speech will take it to heart and
engage in illegal conduct or other antisocial behavior. This is the central meaning of Justice Brandeis's admonition in Whitney v. California:
[N]o danger flowing from speech can be deemed clear and present,
unless the incidence of the evil apprehended is so imminent that it
may befall before there is opportunity for full discussion. If there
be time to expose through discussion the falsehood and fallacies, to
avert the evil by the processes of education, the remedy to be apnot enforced silence. Only an emergency can
plied is more speech,
33 4
repression.
justify
There is no good reason that this admonition should not apply

when the "falsehoods and fallacies" are packaged as instructional material as opposed to advocacy. In both instances the key to whether
the government can censor the speech or sanction the speaker should
be whether a listener has the opportunity to absorb the speaker's message, reflect on it, and then decide 5as a matter of free will to follow the
speaker's bad advice or reject it.33

B.

Theoretical Consistency, First Amendment Jurisprudence, and the
Brandenburg Paradigm

The courts' lenient treatment of civil and criminal sanctions on

antisocial instructional speech is only one manifestation of the main
problem with all the various Brandenburg alternatives that have been
devised recently by the lower courts. The main problem is that all of
334 Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 377 (1927) (Brandeis, J., concurring).
335 In his excellent new paper on the closely related subject of "crime-facilitating
speech," Eugene Volokh argues that there should be no exception to the usual First
Amendment protections of speech even in situations in which the speaker knew that
the speech would aid those engaged in criminal activity but recklessly engaged in the
speech anyway. See Eugene Volokh, Crime-FacilitatingSpeech, 57 STAN. L. REV. 1095
(2005). Professor Volokh draws two exceptions to this rule: first, when the information creates "extraordinarily serious harms," and second, when the speech "seems to
have virtually no noncriminal uses." Id. at 1205-13, 1146-50. Volokh's analysis and
conclusions are largely consistent with the arguments presented in this Article, although the protectiveness of Volokh's rule would depend on how narrowly the courts
interpret Volokh's two exceptions. Volokh is aware of this problem, and is appropriately circumspect about the difficulties of defining the relevant harm threshold that
triggers the exceptions to the rule. Id. at 1205-09.
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these alternatives deviate from the central assumptions that permeate
the Supreme Court's modern First Amendment political speech cases;
in particular, the various Brandenburgalternatives violate the Court's
basic theoretical understanding of the relationship between speech,
risk, governmental control, and individual responsibility in the First
Amendment context. This is not to say that it will ever be possible to
devise a Grand Unification Theory of the First Amendment. The infinitely different number of factual scenarios in which free speech issues arise will always require several different First Amendment
standards to reconcile collective security and efficiency interests with
individual liberty. But the decisions that form the core of the Brandenburg paradigm-i.e., the iconic Holmes and Brandeis opinions in
Abrams, Gitlow, and Whitney; Brandenburg itself; and post-Brandenburg
elaborations on the themes of that case in decisions such as Cohen,
ClaiborneHardware, and Hess-do not merely provide a standard for
analyzing speech; they also implicitly define in a more general sense
the proper role of speech and speakers in a democracy. Thus, even if
the precise components of Brandenburgdo not apply to a particular
instance of speech, the Brandenburgparadigm should infuse every constitutional standard applied to the regulation of human expressionregardless of the mode of expression or the circumstances in which
the expression occurs.
A summary outline of the Brandenburgparadigm would include at
least five essential propositions. The first is the principle of ideological agnosticism. Perhaps the most basic premise of the Court's modern First Amendment jurisprudence is that the government cannot
punish a speaker based on the government's view of the speaker's
ideas. It is only a short step from this unassailable constitutional fact
to the more general proposition that the government must be agnostic as to notions of universal truth and political righteousness. Justice
Jackson's expression of this proposition-that "no official, high or
petty, can prescribe what shall be orthodox in politics, nationalism,
religion, or other matters of opinion or force citizens to confess by
word or act their faith therein"3 36-is one of the most eloquent, but
hardly unique in the constitutional literature. Although some critics
of Justice Jackson's opinion have objected that the country could
never effectively govern itself if it were truly guided by this ultimate
form of political tolerance,3 37 it would be difficult to make sense of
most modern First Amendment law without reference to the principle
336 W. Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 642 (1943).
337 This is more or less the position taken by Justice Frankfurter in his Barnette
dissent. See id. at 646 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting). For a thoughtful recent rendition
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of ideological agnosticism. Just to cite one example, how could one
explain the per se rule against government regulation of speech based
on viewpoint 338 if the government could adopt and enforce through
its criminal law a particular point of view?
The second essential component of the Brandenburgparadigm is
the assumption that society must adopt a high level of collective tolerance for risk stemming from speech. This notion is embedded in the
imminence component of the Brandenburgstandard, and is based on
33 9
Brandeis's notion that "[o] nly an emergency can justify repression."
At the same time, the notion of collective risk tolerance must be wed3 40
Thus, under
ded to a Millian notion of concrete harm to others.
speech
suppress
not
may
government
the
the Brandenburgparadigm
social
a
or
morality
to protect an amorphous concept of community
collecof
ethos. Decorum regulations are not permitted. The notion
tive risk tolerance must be further modified by Brandeis's insistence
that to justify suppression of free speech "there must be reasonable
one. 3 41
ground to believe that the evil to be prevented is a serious
The only thing to add is that this collective tolerance for risk should
be applied to the same extent with regard to all forms of speech. As
noted above, there is no reason why the risks stemming from the dissemination of information should be treated any differently than the
risks flowing from expressions of advocacy. Insofar as the First
Amendment is concerned, risk is risk. The expressive form of that risk
should not matter if the level of the risk falls below what would be
of this objection, see Steven D. Smith, Barnette 's Big Blunder,78 CHI.-KENT L. REv. 615
(2003).
338 See Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of the Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 828-29
(1995).
It is axiomatic that the government may not regulate speech based on its
substantive content or the message it conveys .... In the realm of private
speech or expression, government regulation may not favor one speaker
over another .... Discrimination against speech because of its message is
presumed to be unconstitutional. ...When the government targets not subject matter but particular views taken by speakers on a subject, the violation
of the First Amendment is all the more blatant.... Viewpoint discrimination
is thus an egregious form of content discrimination. The government must
abstain from regulating speech when the specific motivating ideology or the
opinion or perspective of the speaker is the rationale for the restriction.
Id.
339 Whitney, 274 U.S. at 377 (Brandeis, J., concurring).
340 See JOHN STUART MILL, ON LIBERTw 68 (Gertrude Himmelfarb ed., 1974)
(1859) ("[T]he only purpose for which power can be rightfully exercised over any
member of a civilized community, against his will, is to prevent harm to others. His
own good, either physical or moral, is not a sufficient warrant.").
341 Whitney, 274 U.S. at 376 (Brandeis, J., concurring).
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tolerated under the baseline established in the political advocacy
cases.
The third element of the Brandenburgparadigm is that the legal
burden of violating the law should be on the lawbreaker, not the
speaker who gives the lawbreaker the bad idea. The explanation for
this is not, as the Court has occasionally suggested, that there are no
"dangerous ideas." 34 2 The explanation, rather, is that there are lots of
dangerous ideas, and if the government is given the power to suppress
an idea (and its proponent) simply because of its inherent danger, the
First Amendment would truly be worth nothing. As usual, the cynical
Justice Holmes was nothing if not honest about the speech he sought
to protect: "Every idea is an incitement. It offers itself for belief and if
believed it is acted on unless some other belief outweighs it or some
failure of energy stifles the movement at its birth."3

43

For that very

reason, Justice Holmes recognized, the government could not be allowed to suppress any idea unless that idea could be said to lead to a
"present conflagration." 3 44 Otherwise, there is little principled
way of
stopping short of a legally enforced regime of ideological purity.
The fourth component of the Brandenburgparadigm follows from
the third. Because the Court's First Amendment standard assigns primary responsibility to listeners rather than speakers, the Constitution
incorporates what might be termed a listener incredulity assumption.
That is, the Constitution is interpreted under the assumption that the
general public is not stupid, credulous, or evil. The theory (or, as
Justice Holmes put it, the "wager"3 4 5) is that individual citizens will be
able to sort out good from bad without the government intervening.
The country will always produce a certain number of Ted Kaczynskis
and Timothy McVeighs, but no free society would fashion its system of
free speech by reference to those lowest common human
denominators.
The final component of the Brandenburgparadigm is the practical
consequence of the first four: censorship must be the government's
last resort to address impending social harms. Again, injustice Brandeis's phrase, "no danger flowing from speech can be deemed clear
and present, unless the incidence of the evil apprehended is so imminent that it may befall before there is opportunity for full discus342 See Speiser v. Randall, 357 U.S. 513, 519 (1958) (holding unconstitutional a
government program "'aimed at the suppression of dangerous ideas"' (quoting Am.
Communications Ass'n v. Douds, 339 U.S. 382, 402 (1950))).
343 Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652, 673 (1925) (Holmes, J., dissenting).
344 Id. (Holmes, J., dissenting).
345 Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919) (Holmes, J.,dissenting).
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sion. ' ' 3 4 6 In effect, this imposes a least restrictive means analysis
whenever the government seeks to suppress speech. If any alternative
is available to prevent the serious harm, then that alternative must be
attempted before the government is allowed to resort to censorship.
None of these principles is particularly controversial in the political advocacy context. Each of these principles will be familiar to any
student who has been led through the development of the Court's
political speech jurisprudence from Schenck to Brandenburg. The apparent novelty is the suggestion that these same principles should apply with equal force to other categories of free speech challenges.
There is no good reason why these principles should not also apply to
the various categories of speech that have recently been devised by the
courts and are currently being used to circumvent Brandenburg. This
does not mean that the implementation of these principles will be
identical in every context. As noted in Part IV, for example, the typical contexts in which private threats are communicated to their
targets would require a change in the Brandenburganalysis to fully ac3 47
But if the implementation will somecount for the relevant harm.
change in the different contexts.
not
should
times vary, the principles
There is no reason to deviate from the requirement that the government prove the existence of a serious and concrete harm before sanctioning speech in these other contexts. Likewise, there is no reason to
abandon Brandenburg'sassumptions about the credulity and common
sense of individuals reading books, watching videos, and listening to
speakers-even if the speech involved does not fit the model of Brandenburg-style political advocacy.
Perhaps most importantly, there is no reason to forget the key
lesson learned in the post-World War I period that was the crucible in
which the modern First Amendment was forged. The lesson from
those days is that radical dissent has a way of making those associated
with the status quo very nervous, and judges, jurors, and legislators
tend to be closely associated with the status quo. If the discomfort felt
by those in society's mainstream becomes too great, it turns to terror,
and the sources of the fear become perceived as terrorists. The legal
landscape in which these social forces are now playing themselves out
is not comforting. Black is just one example of a disturbing modern
trend. This trend is defined by the proliferation of alternative First
Amendment constructs to regulate antisocial speech. These constructs appear uncoordinated by any central principle and seem limited only by the ingenuity of plaintiffs and prosecutors in fitting
346
347

Whitney, 274 U.S. at 377 (Brandeis, J., concurring).
See supra notes 273-75 and accompanying text.
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familiar examples of antisocial speech into the new regulatory patterns. In this atmosphere, some overriding constitutional framework
is needed to limit the expansion of the new categories and constrain
the use of flexible terms such as "intimidation" and "terrorism." The
Brandenburgparadigm was devised to serve precisely that function, if
the courts would only use it.
CONCLUSION

It is impossible to predict the lasting consequences of Black. It
may end up doing little to the civil liberties landscape, or it may end
up being one of a number of small cuts that eventually bleed the life
out of Brandenburgand subsequent cases that realized the promise of
the Holmes and Brandeis free speech opinions. Justice O'Connor's
opinion for the Court in Black certainly does not position the case as
anything like an assault on basic First Amendment principles. Quite
the contrary, Justice O'Connor treats the case as a simple application
of existing exceptions to the general protections offered by the First
Amendment. Unfortunately, this is perhaps the greatest danger
posed by opinions like Black. Exceptions to the immediate harm principle represented by Brandenburg continue to multiply. The perception that these cases are unexceptionable footnotes to the First
Amendment is more likely to corrode basic free speech protections
than any frontal assault of the sort seen immediately following the two
World Wars. Those crisis periods brought basic challenges to fundamental principles, which in turn generated equally basic defenses of
those principles. The slow erosion of protections in the modern era is
unlikely to produce equally vociferous defenses because the erosion is
not even noticed until the landscape has already been fundamentally
altered.
One of the few benefits society gains from going through a time
of crisis is a forced reconsideration of that society's basic principles.
During calmer times the importance of those basic principles is simply
assumed, and therefore they seldom get defended in the intellectual
marketplace. It is an odd but common phenomenon that the lack of
constant defense allows principles to become brittle and weak, and
therefore vulnerable to the sudden pressure generated during times
of crisis to forego civil liberties for security in an environment when
the country's very existence seems at stake. Vincent Blasi recognized
this truth when he urged scholars and judges to view the First Amendment from a pathological perspective, with a view toward protecting
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48
We
this most basic freedom when it is most susceptible to attack.
are in the midst of another pathological period in American history.

Black will do little to help us survive it.

348 See Vincent Blasi, The PathologicalPerspective and the FirstAmendment, 85 COLUM.
L. REv. 449, 449-50 (1985) ("[T]he overriding objective at all times should be to
equip the first amendment to do maximum service in those historical periods when
intolerance of unorthodox ideas is most prevalent and when governments are most
able and most likely to stifle dissent systematically.").
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